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Linking Economic and Social-Exchange Games: From the Community Norm to CSR

In: Social Capital, Corporate Social Responsibility, Economic Behaviour and Performance

Author

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  • Masahiko Aoki

Abstract

Why are corporations engaged in various non-economic activities to meet societal demands (such as environmental protection) beyond their legal obligations? In other words, why do corporations ‘over-comply’ (Heal 2005) with the social demands? Does it benefit corporations (their stockholders)? If so, how? Common-sense-wise an answer may appear obvious. However, it may not necessarily be so for the prevailing framework of economists’ thinking: ‘corporations do not need to do anything beyond legal obligations in order to serve stockholders interests’. The object of this chapter is to suggest an analytical framework to challenge such orthodox views without abandoning the premise of a bounded-rationality of agents concerned (various stakeholders of corporations as well as the citizens of the society). An essential idea is to endogenize the relevance of such social constructs as (individual) social capital, norms, status ascriptions and the like to economic behaviors within an expanded framework of game-theoretic thinking.

Suggested Citation

  • Masahiko Aoki, 2011. "Linking Economic and Social-Exchange Games: From the Community Norm to CSR," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Lorenzo Sacconi & Giacomo Degli Antoni (ed.), Social Capital, Corporate Social Responsibility, Economic Behaviour and Performance, chapter 5, pages 129-148, Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-30618-9_6
    DOI: 10.1057/9780230306189_6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Minghui Li & Faqin Lan & Fang Zhang, 2019. "Why Chinese Financial Market Investors Do Not Care about Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(11), pages 1-34, June.
    2. Hami Amiraslani & Karl V. Lins & Henri Servaes & Ane Tamayo, 2023. "Trust, social capital, and the bond market benefits of ESG performance," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 421-462, June.
    3. Neva Štumberger & Urša Golob, 2016. "On the Discursive Construction of Corporate Social Responsibility in Advertising Agencies," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 137(3), pages 521-536, September.
    4. Cheung, Adrian (Wai Kong), 2016. "Corporate social responsibility and corporate cash holdings," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 412-430.
    5. Servaes, Henri & Tamayo, Ane, 2017. "The role of social capital in corporations: a review," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 69209, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate Social Responsibility; Social Capital; Social Norm; Social Exchange; Community Norm;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities

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