Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

The Divergence of the Italian and Japanese Corporate Governance Models: The Role of Institutional Shocks

Contents:

Author Info

  • Fabrizio Barca

    (Treasury, Rome.)

  • Katsuhito Iwai

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.)

  • Ugo Pagano

    (University of Siena.)

  • Sandro Trento

    (Bank of Italy, Rome.)

Abstract

The paper first considers a number of theoretical aspects surrounding the ambiguity of the legal framework defining the modern corporation and the two-way relation between technology and property rights. It then looks at the evolution of corporate governance through time, paying particular attention to the different roles played by the American occupation in the two countries - in Italy this involved the reinforcement of the state-owned corporations and family controlled pyramidal groups that had emerged during the fascist period, whereas in Japan the occupation forces destroyed the power of the great zaibatsu families. The analysis shows how inter-firm share holding can promote (Japan)or inhibit (Italy) the expansion of large corporations and discusses the mechanisms that have made each model self-sustaining after the initial institutional shocks.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/98/cf32/contents.htm
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo in its series CIRJE F-Series with number CIRJE-F-32.

as in new window
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Dec 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:98cf32

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Hongo 7-3-1, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033
Phone: +81-3-5841-5644
Fax: +81-3-5841-8294
Email:
Web page: http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/index.html
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Masahiko Aoki, 2007. "Linking Economic and Social-Exchange Games: From the Community Norm to CSR," Discussion Papers 07-018, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  2. Masahiko Aoki, 2006. "Mechanisms of Endogenous Institutional Change," Discussion Papers 05-013, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:98cf32. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CIRJE administrative office).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.