Sustainability, Debt Management, and Public Debt Policy in Japan
In: Fiscal Policy and Management in East Asia, NBER-EASE, Volume 16
AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to analyze sustainability issues of Japan's fiscal policy and then to discuss the debt management policy using theoretical models and numerical studies. We also investigate the desirable coordination of fiscal and monetary authorities toward fiscal reconstruction. We include a potential possibilities of the government bonds in our theoretical model The public bonds, therefore, cannot be sold when the issuance leads the amount of debt outstanding to be more than a certain level. In this respect, the fiscal authority has to take into account the upper limit of stocks of public debt. This possibility of debt default provides the fiscal authority to issue public bonds strategically in an earlier period. A strategic behavior of fiscal authority induces the monetary authority, in a later period, to boost output and raise seigniorage revenues to eliminate the distortion of resource allocation due to the limitation on debt issuance. Therefore, the monetary policy in a later period suffers from an inflation bias from the ax ante point of view. There are two ways to eliminate this distortion toward successful fiscal reconstruction. One of them is to make the monetary authority more conservative than society in the sense that the price stability weight of monetary authority is higher than that of society. The other way of eliminating the distortion of the resource allocation is to design an institutional ceiling on the debt issuance. The direct ceiling can provide a binding constraint of the public bond issuance for the fiscal authority of Japan because it has accumulated the debt outstanding much more than other countries.
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Other versions of this item:
- Takero Doi & Toshihiro Ihori & Kiyoshi Mitsui, 2005. "Sustainability, Debt Management, and Public Debt Policy in Japan," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-387, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Takero Doi & Toshihiro Ihori & Kiyoshi Mitsui, 2006. "Sustainability, Debt Management, and Public Debt Policy in Japan," NBER Working Papers 12357, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Takero Doi & Toshihiro Ihori & Kiyoshi Mitsui, 2005. "Sustainability, Debt Management, and Public Debt Policy in Japan," CARF F-Series CARF-F-055, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
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- Persson, Mats & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1987. "Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1419-31, November.
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