Pohan Fong
Personal Details
First Name: | Pohan |
Middle Name: | |
Last Name: | Fong |
Suffix: | |
RePEc Short-ID: | pfo60 |
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public] | |
http://troi.cc.rochester.edu/~fong | |
Terminal Degree: | Economics Department; University of Rochester (from RePEc Genealogy) |
Affiliation
Economics Department
University of Rochester
Rochester, New York (United States)http://www.econ.rochester.edu/
RePEc:edi:edrocus (more details at EDIRC)
Research output
Jump to: Working papersWorking papers
- Daniel Diermeier & Pohan Fong, 2009.
"Endogenous Limits on Proposal Power,"
Discussion Papers
1464, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Pohan Fong, 2008. "Endogenous Limits on Proposal Power," Discussion Papers 1465, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Pohan Fong, 2008. "Existence and Computation of Pure-strategy Equilibria in Models of Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration," Discussion Papers 1466, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Baron, David P. & Diermeier, Daniel & Fong, Pohan, 2007. "Policy Dynamics and Inefficiency in a Parliamentary Democracy with Proportional Representation," Research Papers 1960, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
Citations
Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.Working papers
- Daniel Diermeier & Pohan Fong, 2009.
"Endogenous Limits on Proposal Power,"
Discussion Papers
1464, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Pohan Fong, 2008. "Endogenous Limits on Proposal Power," Discussion Papers 1465, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
Cited by:
- John Duggan & Tasos Kalandrakis, 2009.
"A Newton Collocation Method for Solving Dynamic Bargaining Games,"
Wallis Working Papers
WP60, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- John Duggan & Tasos Kalandrakis, 2011. "A Newton collocation method for solving dynamic bargaining games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(3), pages 611-650, April.
- Anesi, Vincent, 2010.
"Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 488-493, November.
- Vincent Anesi, 2009. "Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games," RCER Working Papers 551, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Vincent Anesi, 2007. "Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games," Discussion Papers 2007-09, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Paulo Reis Mourao, 2019. "The effectiveness of Green voices in parliaments: Do Green Parties matter in the control of pollution?," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 985-1011, April.
- Tasos Kalandrakis, 2010. "Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(4), pages 617-643, October.
- Daniel Diermeier & Pohan Fong, 2011. "Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(2), pages 947-985.
- Pohan Fong, 2008.
"Existence and Computation of Pure-strategy Equilibria in Models of Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration,"
Discussion Papers
1466, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
Cited by:
- Anesi, Vincent, 2010.
"Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 488-493, November.
- Vincent Anesi, 2009. "Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games," RCER Working Papers 551, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Vincent Anesi, 2007. "Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games," Discussion Papers 2007-09, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Anesi, Vincent, 2010.
"Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 488-493, November.
- Baron, David P. & Diermeier, Daniel & Fong, Pohan, 2007.
"Policy Dynamics and Inefficiency in a Parliamentary Democracy with Proportional Representation,"
Research Papers
1960, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
Cited by:
- Renström, Thomas I & Marsiliani, Laura, 2007. "Political Institutions and Economic Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 6143, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Francesco Giovannoni, 2012.
"Corruption and Power in Democracies,"
Bristol Economics Discussion Papers
12/624, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- Francesco Giovannoni & Daniel Seidmann, 2014. "Corruption and power in democracies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(3), pages 707-734, March.
- Francesco Giovannoni & Daniel J. Seidmann, 2008. "Corruption and Power in Democracies," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 08/192, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
- Pohan Fong & Daniel Diermeier, 2007. "Policy Persistence in Multi-party Parliamentary Democracies," 2007 Meeting Papers 248, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Laura Marsiliani & Thomas Renström, 2007. "Political institutions and economic growth," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 233-261, May.
More information
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