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Finding the Pareto optimal equitable allocation of homogeneous divisible goods among three players

Author

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  • Marco Dall'Aglio
  • Camilla Di Luca
  • Lucia Milone

Abstract

We consider the allocation of a finite number of homogeneous divisible items among three players. Under the assumption that each player assigns a positive value to every item, we develop a simple algorithm that returns a Pareto optimal and equitable allocation. This is based on the tight relationship between two geometric objects of fair division: The Individual Pieces Set (IPS) and the Radon–Nykodim Set (RNS). The algorithm can be considered as an extension of the Adjusted Winner procedure by Brams and Taylor to the three-player case, without the guarantee of envy-freeness.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Dall'Aglio & Camilla Di Luca & Lucia Milone, 2017. "Finding the Pareto optimal equitable allocation of homogeneous divisible goods among three players," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 27(3), pages 35-50.
    • Handle: RePEc:wut:journl:v:3:y:2017:p:35-50:id:1330
    DOI: 10.5277/ord170303
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    5. Barbanel,Julius B. Introduction by-Name:Taylor,Alan D., 2005. "The Geometry of Efficient Fair Division," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521842488.
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