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Endogenously proportional bargaining solutions

Author

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  • Ismail Saglam

    (TOBB University of Economics and Technology)

Abstract

This paper introduces a class of endogenously proportional bargaining solutions. These solutions are inside the class of Directional solutions, which Chun and Thomson (1987) proposed to generalize (exogenously) proportional solutions of Kalai (1977). Endogenously proportional solutions are characterized by weak Pareto optimality and continuity together with two new axioms that depend on the total payoff asymmetry of the bargaining problem. Each of these solutions satisfies the basic symmetry axiom and also a stronger axiom called total payoff symmetry.

Suggested Citation

  • Ismail Saglam, 2013. "Endogenously proportional bargaining solutions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(2), pages 1521-1534.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-12-00888
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-518, May.
    2. Rubinstein, Ariel & Safra, Zvi & Thomson, William, 1992. "On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-expected Utility Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1171-1186, September.
    3. Kalai, Ehud, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1623-1630, October.
    4. Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William, 1990. "Egalitarian solutions and uncertain disagreement points," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 29-33, May.
    5. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    6. Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William, 1990. "Bargaining with Uncertain Disagreement Points," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 951-959, July.
    7. Peters, Hans J M, 1986. "Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(1), pages 153-169, January.
    8. Roth, Alvin E, 1979. "Proportional Solutions to the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 775-777, May.
    9. Jens Leth Hougaard & Mich Tvede, 2010. "n-Person Nonconvex Bargaining: Efficient Proportional Solution," Discussion Papers 10-21, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    10. Anbarci, Nejat & Bigelow, John P., 1994. "The area monotonic solution to the cooperative bargaining problem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 133-142, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperative bargaining; proportional solutions; symmetry;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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