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Contribution Limits and Transparency in a Campaign Finance Experiment

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  • Dmitry Shapiro
  • Arthur Zillante

Abstract

We experimentally compare electoral outcomes when donor contribution limits are varied. The effect of contribution limits is studied under three levels of transparency: one where donors' preferences and donations are unobserved by the candidate and public; one where they are observed by the candidate but not the public; and one where they are observed by all. We find that a combination of stricter contribution limits and full transparency is most successful at limiting donors' influence on policy choice. We also find that stricter contribution limits improve social welfare in some treatments. We further find that the partial and no anonymity settings lead to “centrist bias,” whereby implemented policies, on average, are more centrist than the candidate's preferences in most treatments.

Suggested Citation

  • Dmitry Shapiro & Arthur Zillante, 2017. "Contribution Limits and Transparency in a Campaign Finance Experiment," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(1), pages 98-119, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:84:y:2017:i:1:p:98-119
    DOI: 10.1002/soej.12220
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