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An Experimental Study Of Alternative Campaign Finance Systems: Transparency, Donations, And Policy Choices

Author

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  • Hanming Fang
  • Dmitry Shapiro
  • Arthur Zillante

Abstract

type="main" xml:id="ecin12209-abs-0001"> We experimentally study the transparency effect of alternative campaign finance systems on donations, election outcomes, policy choices, and welfare. Three alternatives are considered: one where donors' preferences and donations are unobserved by the candidate and public; one where they are observed by the candidate but not the public; and one where they are observed by all. We label them full anonymity (FA), partial anonymity (PA), and no anonymity (NA), respectively. We find that in NA and PA candidates consistently respond to donations by choosing policies favoring the donors. FA, in contrast, is the most successful in limiting the influence of donations on policy choices. Donors benefit greatly from the possibility of donations whereas social welfare may be harmed in some treatments. To our knowledge, this article is the first to investigate the effect of different campaign finance systems distinguished by their transparency level. (JEL D72)

Suggested Citation

  • Hanming Fang & Dmitry Shapiro & Arthur Zillante, 2016. "An Experimental Study Of Alternative Campaign Finance Systems: Transparency, Donations, And Policy Choices," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(1), pages 485-507, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:54:y:2016:i:1:p:485-507
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ecin.2016.54.issue-1
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    Cited by:

    1. Dmitry Shapiro & Arthur Zillante, 2017. "Contribution Limits and Transparency in a Campaign Finance Experiment," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(1), pages 98-119, July.
    2. Ulrich Matter & Alois Stutzer, 2019. "Does Public Attention Reduce The Influence Of Moneyed Interests? Policy Positions On Sopa/Pipa Before And After The Internet Blackout," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 57(4), pages 1879-1895, October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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