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Does CEO compensation matter in boosting firm performance? Evidence from listed French firms

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  • Faten Zoghlami

Abstract

The paper investigates the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation on firm performance from a sample of 155 listed French companies on SBF 120, over 2009–2018. Findings suggest that an increase in CEO compensation seems to improve the accounting‐based firm performance, nevertheless it hurts the firm stock market value. More pronounced results are reported when we control for sector compensation interactions. We argue that attractive compensation may improve the executive services in achieving shareholders' objectives, but investors seem to not appreciate a CEO compensation increase. Based on the agency theory, it might be argued that investors fear possible executive opportunistic behavior encouraging them to enjoy overcompensation.

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  • Faten Zoghlami, 2021. "Does CEO compensation matter in boosting firm performance? Evidence from listed French firms," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(1), pages 143-155, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:42:y:2021:i:1:p:143-155
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.3219
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jebreel Mohammad Al-Al-Msiedeen & Fawzi A. Al Sawalqa, 2021. "Ownership Structure and CEO Compensation: Evidence from Jordan," Asian Economic and Financial Review, Asian Economic and Social Society, vol. 11(5), pages 365-383, May.
    2. Clement Olalekan Olaniyi & Ademola Obafemi Young & Xuan Vinh Vo & Mamdouh Abdulaziz Saleh Al‐Faryan, 2022. "Do institutional framework and its threshold matter in the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance? Fresh insights from an emerging market economy," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(8), pages 3386-3403, December.
    3. Mohit Pathak & Arti Chandani, 2023. "Board composition, executive compensation, and financial performance: panel evidence from India," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 20(4), pages 359-373, December.
    4. Tutun Mukherjee & Som Sankar Sen, 2022. "Impact of CEO attributes on corporate reputation, financial performance, and corporate sustainable growth: evidence from India," Financial Innovation, Springer;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, vol. 8(1), pages 1-50, December.

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