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Closing the Deal: Principals, Agents, and Subagents in New Zealand Land Reform

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  • Ann L. Brower
  • Philip Meguire
  • Adrian Monks

Abstract

This paper uses bargaining dynamics, administrative politics, and agency theory to examine financial outcomes from New Zealand land reform. Results are inconsistent with payments arising from a bargain in which both the Crown and lessee advocate to their full potential, and are instead consistent with the Crown backing down to lessees’ desires for a generous deal. This back-down stems either from "bureaucratic coping," or from the addition of a bureaucratic middleman between the Crown principal and its negotiator subagent, exacerbating the principal-agent problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Ann L. Brower & Philip Meguire & Adrian Monks, 2010. "Closing the Deal: Principals, Agents, and Subagents in New Zealand Land Reform," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 86(3).
    • Handle: RePEc:uwp:landec:v:86:y:2010:iii:1:p467-492
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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