How the Market Solves an Assignment Problem: The Matching of Lawyers with Legal Claims
AbstractIn the market for lawyers, observable data on promotion and turnover can be explained by reference to the idea that there is positive assortative mating of lawyers and legal claim s. There is a scale-of-resources effect, under which it is optimal to assign larger claims to lawyers of higher quality. In a law firm, th e institution of "tenure" performs a sorting function. Lawyers foun d to be of high quality are given tenured positions and the rest leav e. The value of legal claims handled by a firm determines its sorting problem, which in turn determines its promotion ladder and turnover. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.
Volume (Year): 5 (1987)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Koch, Alexander K. & Peyrache, Eloic, 2005. "Tournaments, Individualized Contracts and Career Concerns," IZA Discussion Papers 1841, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Oreopoulos, Philip & Heisz, Andrew, 2006. "The Importance of Signalling in Job Placement and Promotion," Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series 2006236e, Statistics Canada, Analytical Studies Branch.
- Oreopoulos, Philip & Heisz, Andrew, 2006. "Importance des signaux de competence pour l'obtention d'un emploi et de l'avancement," Direction des etudes analytiques : documents de recherche 2006236f, Statistics Canada, Direction des etudes analytiques.
- Derek Neal & Sherwin Rosen, 1998. "Theories of the Distribution of Labor Earnings," NBER Working Papers 6378, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gómez, 2002. "Cashing by the hour: Why large law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent fees," Economics Working Papers 639, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Alexander K. Koch & Eloïc Peyrache, 2008.
"Aligning Ambition and Incentives,"
Economics Working Papers
2008-16, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
- Alexander K. Koch & Eloic Peyrache, 2005. "Aligning Ambition and Incentives," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 05/03, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Mar 2005.
- Koch, Alexander K. & Peyrache, Eloic, 2005. "Aligning Ambition and Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 1527, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Baptista, Rui & Lima, Francisco & Preto, Miguel Torres, 2012. "How former business owners fare in the labor market? Job assignment and earnings," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 263-276.
- Fang, Jieyan & Kempf, Alexander & Trapp, Monika, 2014. "Fund Manager Allocation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(3), pages 661-674.
- Jiawei Chen, 2006. "Two-Sided Matching and Spread Determinants in the Loan Market," Working Papers 060702, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.