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How the Market Solves an Assignment Problem: The Matching of Lawyers with Legal Claims

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  • Spurr, Stephen J

Abstract

In the market for lawyers, observable data on promotion and turnover can be explained by reference to the idea that there is positive assortative mating of lawyers and legal claim s. There is a scale-of-resources effect, under which it is optimal to assign larger claims to lawyers of higher quality. In a law firm, th e institution of "tenure" performs a sorting function. Lawyers foun d to be of high quality are given tenured positions and the rest leav e. The value of legal claims handled by a firm determines its sorting problem, which in turn determines its promotion ladder and turnover. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.

Volume (Year): 5 (1987)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 502-32

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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:5:y:1987:i:4:p:502-32

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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE/

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Cited by:
  1. Koch, Alexander K. & Peyrache, Eloic, 2005. "Tournaments, Individualized Contracts and Career Concerns," IZA Discussion Papers 1841, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Oreopoulos, Philip & Heisz, Andrew, 2006. "The Importance of Signalling in Job Placement and Promotion," Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series 2006236e, Statistics Canada, Analytical Studies Branch.
  3. Oreopoulos, Philip & Heisz, Andrew, 2006. "Importance des signaux de competence pour l'obtention d'un emploi et de l'avancement," Direction des etudes analytiques : documents de recherche 2006236f, Statistics Canada, Direction des etudes analytiques.
  4. Derek Neal & Sherwin Rosen, 1998. "Theories of the Distribution of Labor Earnings," NBER Working Papers 6378, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gómez, 2002. "Cashing by the hour: Why large law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent fees," Economics Working Papers 639, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  6. Alexander K. Koch & Eloïc Peyrache, 2008. "Aligning Ambition and Incentives," Economics Working Papers 2008-16, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  7. Baptista, Rui & Lima, Francisco & Preto, Miguel Torres, 2012. "How former business owners fare in the labor market? Job assignment and earnings," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 263-276.
  8. Fang, Jieyan & Kempf, Alexander & Trapp, Monika, 2014. "Fund Manager Allocation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(3), pages 661-674.
  9. Jiawei Chen, 2006. "Two-Sided Matching and Spread Determinants in the Loan Market," Working Papers 060702, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.

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