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Persuasion is now 30 per cent of US GDP

Author

Listed:
  • Gerry Antioch

    (Treasury, Government of Australia)

Abstract

Persuasion is the common thread in almost all voluntary transactions. With persuasion’s footprint in the modern economy substantial and growing, this paper briefly scans the recent literature and suggests the McCloskey-Klamer estimate of the persuasion content of GDP could now be higher.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerry Antioch, 2013. "Persuasion is now 30 per cent of US GDP," Economic Roundup, The Treasury, Australian Government, issue 1, pages 1-10, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:tsy:journl:journl_tsy_er_2013_1_1
    as

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    File URL: http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Publications%20and%20Media/Publications/2013/Economic%20Roundup%20Issue%201/Downloads/PDF/01_Persuasion.ashx
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    File URL: http://www.treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2013/Roundup-1/Report/Persuasion-is-now-30-per-cent-of-US-GDP
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stergios Skaperdas & Samarth Vaidya, 2012. "Persuasion as a contest," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(2), pages 465-486, October.
    2. Sendhil Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, 2005. "Persuasion in Finance," NBER Working Papers 11838, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Hamelin, Nicolas & Thaichon, Park & Abraham, Christopher & Driver, Nicholas & Lipscombe, Joe & Pillai, Jayarethanam, 2020. "Storytelling, the scale of persuasion and retention: A neuromarketing approach," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).
    2. Emaad Manzoor & George H. Chen & Dokyun Lee & Michael D. Smith, 2020. "Influence via Ethos: On the Persuasive Power of Reputation in Deliberation Online," Papers 2006.00707, arXiv.org.
    3. Semyon Malamud & Andreas Schrimpf, 2021. "Persuasion by Dimension Reduction," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 21-69, Swiss Finance Institute.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic persuasion;

    JEL classification:

    • A10 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - General
    • E01 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Measurement and Data on National Income and Product Accounts and Wealth; Environmental Accounts

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