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Why are Some Salespeople More Aggressive than Others?

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  • Wan-Ju Franz

Abstract

Why are salespeople in certain industries (such as cars and mattresses) aggressive, while their counterparts in other industries (such as luxury boutiques) relatively customer-oriented? Using a principal-agent-customer model, this paper demonstrates that the level of salesperson aggressiveness depends on: (1) the proportion of customers with a high willingness to pay; (2) whether or not customers are well-informed and (3) repeat customers. If the proportion of customers with a high willingness to pay is relatively large, then salespeople tend to be customer-oriented. By contrast, if the proportion of customers with a high willingness to pay is relatively small, then salespeople tend to be aggressive toward uninformed customers while well-informed customers shun the store. Finally, if the proportion of customers with a high willingness to pay is relatively small, then in an infinitely repeated game, the agent can close sales with well-informed customers without being aggressive, provided that the principal is patient enough about future profit. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Wan-Ju Franz, 2014. "Why are Some Salespeople More Aggressive than Others?," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 42(4), pages 383-397, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:42:y:2014:i:4:p:383-397
    DOI: 10.1007/s11293-014-9427-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen, 2007. "Introduction to Behavioral Economics and Its Applications," Introductory Chapters, in: Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen (ed.),Behavioral Economics and Its Applications, Princeton University Press.
    2. Stergios Skaperdas & Samarth Vaidya, 2012. "Persuasion as a contest," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(2), pages 465-486, October.
    3. Sanjog Misra & Anne Coughlan & Chakravarthi Narasimhan, 2005. "Salesforce Compensation: An Analytical and Empirical Examination of the Agency Theoretic Approach," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 5-39, January.
    4. Coughlan, Anne T & Narasimhan, Chakravarthi, 1992. "An Empirical Analysis of Sales-Force Compensation Plans," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(1), pages 93-121, January.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Salesperson behavior; Sales tactics; Game theory; Marketing; M3; D0;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M3 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising
    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General

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