What Drives Norm Success? Evidence from Anti–Fossil FuelCampaigns

Why do some international norms succeed, whereas others fail? We argue that normcampaigns are more likely to succeed when the actions they prescribe are framedas a solution to salient problems that potential adopters face, even ifdifferent from the problem that originally motivated norm entrepreneurs. Forinstance, the campaign to reduce environmentally harmful fossil fuel subsidieshas been more effective when linked to fiscal stability, a common problem thatpolicy makers face. Problem linkages can thus bolster the attractiveness of aproposed new norm and broaden the coalition of actors that support the norm. Weprobe the plausibility of this argument by studying two campaigns that aim toshift patterns of finance for fossil fuel production and consumption: subsidyreform and divestment. Subsidy reform encourages governments to reduce subsidiesfor products like gasoline; divestment encourages investors to sell or avoidequity stocks from fossil fuel industries. We look at the variation in theimpact of these two campaigns over time and argue that they have achievedinstitutional acceptance and implementation chiefly when their advocates havebeen able to link environmental goals with other goals, usually economicones.