An efficient privatization mechanism
AbstractWe consider the privatization of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) of which markets can be opened to competition once privatization takes place and competitors can compete successfully against them in a few years. The currently used “Revenue Maximization (RM)” scheme maximizes the government revenue from privatization but does not provide incentives for the privatized SOE to charge a price lower than the monopoly price until competition arises. We propose the “Welfare Maximization (WM)” scheme, which induces the privatized SOE to charge a competitive price without resorting to regulation. Also, WM provides greater incentives for post-privatization cost reduction.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Journal of Economic Policy Reform.
Volume (Year): 2 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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- John Vickers & George Yarrow, 1988. "Privatization: An Economic Analysis," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262720116, December.
- Mohamed Jellal & François-Charles Wolff, 2003.
"Privatisation et négociation collective,"
Revue d’économie du développement,
De Boeck Université, vol. 17(1), pages 73-99.
- Jellal, Mohamed & wolff, François-Charles, 2003.
"Privatisation et négociation collective
[Privatization and collective bargaining]," MPRA Paper 38367, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jellal, Mohamed & wolff, François-Charles, 2003. "Privatisation et négociation collective
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