Human Development and Electoral Systems
AbstractThe aim of this paper is to test whether electoral systems and human development are linked. Using high-quality data and very simple panel data econometric techniques, we show that electoral systems play a critical role in explaining the difference in the levels of human development between countries. We find that countries which have proportional systems enjoy higher levels of human development than those with majoritarian systems, thanks to more redistributive fiscal policies. We also find that when the degree of proportionality, based on the mean electoral district size, increases, so does human development.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Journal of Human Development and Capabilities.
Volume (Year): 7 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Other versions of this item:
- Marjorie Gassner & Darwin Ugarte Ontiveros & Vincenzo Verardi, 2006. "Human development and electoral systems," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9883, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Marjorie Gassner & Darwin Ugarte Ontiveros & Vincenzo Verardi, 2005. "Human Development and Electoral Systems," Others 0508006, EconWPA.
- I32 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Measurement and Analysis of Poverty
- H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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