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Systemic Flexibility, Production Fragmentation and Cluster Governance

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  • Lisa De Propris

Abstract

The recent process of production fragmentation and the rapid growth of firm clusters have been explained by the increasing need for output flexibility. Although the mainstream literature relates flexibility mostly to labour adjustments, this paper investigates sources of flexibility as being related to forms of inter-firm production. Two extreme cases are compared: industrial districts and monopsonistic clusters. The nature and the implications of production flexibility are discussed in both settings. It is argued that the governance structure of industrial districts affects the dynamics of inter-firm linkages, which in turn enables systemic flexibility to be achieved.

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  • Lisa De Propris, 2001. "Systemic Flexibility, Production Fragmentation and Cluster Governance," European Planning Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(6), pages 739-753, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:eurpls:v:9:y:2001:i:6:p:739-753
    DOI: 10.1080/713666511
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    1. Guth, W. & Kliemt, H., 1993. "Competition or Co-Operation," Papers 9339, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Mathews & Peter Stokes, 2013. "The creation of trust: the interplay of rationality, institutions and exchange," Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(9-10), pages 845-866, December.
    2. Lisa De Propris & Ping Wei, 2007. "Governance and Competitiveness in the Birmingham Jewellery District," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 44(12), pages 2465-2486, November.
    3. Rafael Pardo & Ruth Rama, 2013. "Is the Pro-Network Bias Justified?," SAGE Open, , vol. 3(3), pages 21582440134, July.
    4. José Quesada-Vázquez & Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Cohard, 2019. "Subsidiary upgrading and regional innovation policies: The case of Valeo lighting Systems Spain and the Andalusian Plastic Innovation Centre," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 37(5), pages 908-928, August.
    5. Guven Sak & Erol Taymaz, 2004. "How Flexible are Small Firms? An Analysis on the Determinants of Flexibility," Working Papers 0416, Economic Research Forum, revised Aug 2004.
    6. Jiang Wei & Minfei Zhou & Mark Greeven & Hongyan Qu, 2016. "Economic governance, dual networks and innovative learning in five Chinese industrial clusters," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 1037-1074, December.
    7. Ruth Rama & Adelheid Holl, 2013. "Subcontracting relationships," Chapters, in: Anna Grandori (ed.), Handbook of Economic Organization, chapter 28, Edward Elgar Publishing.

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