Evolutionary Norm Enforcement
AbstractApplying an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation, we show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. By analyzing the crowding out or crowding in of trustworthiness implied by various verdict rules, we can assess how a court influences the share of kept promises of 'truly' trustworthy players who evolutionarily evolved as trustworthy and of opportunistic players woh are only trustworthy if inspired by material incentives.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 156 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.mohr.de/jite
Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
Other versions of this item:
- Werner Güth & Axel Ockenfels, 2000. "Evolutionary Norm Enforcement," CESifo Working Paper Series 331, CESifo Group Munich.
- Güth, Werner & Ockenfels, Axel, 1999. "Evolutionary norm enforcement," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1999,84, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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