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The consensus equilibria of mining gap games related to the stability of Blockchain Ecosystems

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  • Lan Di
  • George X. Yuan
  • Tu Zeng

Abstract

The equity and currency tokens are typically two kinds of initial coin offerings (ICOs) like Bitcoin or Ethereum based on the platform of Blockchains to provide a particular product or service, it is very important to study the mechanism of Blockchain Ecosystems. The goal of this paper is to explain the stable in the sense for the existence of consensus equilibria for mining gap games by using one new concept called ‘consensus games (CG)’ under the framework of Blockchain Ecosystems which mainly mean the economic activities by taking into the account of three types of different factors which are expenses, reward mechanism and mining power for the work on blockschain by applying consensuses including the ‘Proof of Work’ due to Nakamoto in 2008 as a special case.

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  • Lan Di & George X. Yuan & Tu Zeng, 2021. "The consensus equilibria of mining gap games related to the stability of Blockchain Ecosystems," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(4-5), pages 419-440, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:eurjfi:v:27:y:2021:i:4-5:p:419-440
    DOI: 10.1080/1351847X.2020.1776352
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    1. Crettez, Bertrand & Nessah, Rabia & Tazdaït, Tarik, 2022. "On the strong hybrid solution of an n-person game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 61-68.

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