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Nato burden sharing revisited

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  • Binyam Solomon

Abstract

This paper revisits the NATO burden sharing debate with particular emphasis on the use of non-parametric tests that measure the equality of relative benefits and burdens. While the joint product model makes a compelling case for the equality of benefits and burdens in NATO after 1967 (as a consequence of a change in doctrine) the empirical validation of the model is not robust when using non-parametric methods. The lack of knowledge of each ally's utility function, as well as the fact that an ally may have different benefits other than the protection of its industrial base, exposed border and population to consider render the test less robust, as shown in this study. Sensitivity analysis such as the one employed in this paper should be a standard procedure when devising new proxy measures and tests for burden sharing in NATO.

Suggested Citation

  • Binyam Solomon, 2004. "Nato burden sharing revisited," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(3), pages 251-258.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:15:y:2004:i:3:p:251-258
    DOI: 10.1080/10242690320001608917
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Todd Sandler, 1993. "The Economic Theory of Alliances," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(3), pages 446-483, September.
    2. Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler, 2001. "Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(3), pages 869-896, September.
    3. Jyoti Khanna & Todd Sandler & Hirofumi Shimizu, 1998. "Sharing the Financial Burden for U.N. and NATO Peacekeeping, 1976-1996," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(2), pages 176-195, April.
    4. Todd Sandler & James C. Murdoch, 2000. "On sharing NATO defence burdens in the 1990s and beyond," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 21(3), pages 297-327, September.
    5. Jyoti Khanna & Todd Sandler, 1997. "Conscription, peace-keeping, and foreign assistance: NATO burden sharing in the post-cold war era," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 101-121.
    6. Sandler, Todd & Khanna, Jyoti & Shimizu, Hirofumi, 1998. "Sharing the Financial Burden for Un and Nato Peacekeeping: 1976-96," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1216, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Todd Sandler, 2005. "Nato Benefits, Burdens And Borders: Comment," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 317-321.
    2. Becker Jordan & Kuokštytė Ringailė & Kuokštis Vytautas, 2023. "The Political Economy of Transatlantic Security – A Policy Perspective," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 55-77, June.
    3. Binyam Solomon, 2005. "Nato Benefits, Burdens And Borders: Reply," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 323-326.
    4. Jomana Amara, 2008. "Nato Defense Expenditures: Common Goals Or Diverging Interests? A Structural Analysis," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(6), pages 449-469.

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