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Burden Sharing in the Funding of the UNHCR: Refugee Protection as an Impure Public Good

Author

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  • Steven D. Roper

    (Department of Political Science, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, sdr@stevendroper.com)

  • Lilian A. Barria

    (Department of Political Science, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston)

Abstract

The authors apply the theory of collective action and alliance behavior first developed by Olson and Zeckhauser and later extended by Sandler in a series of studies to test whether the nature of refugee protection influences state motivations to provide contributions. The authors investigate whether refugee protection can be viewed as a pure public good with the concomitant problem of free riding leading to suboptimal outcomes or whether contributions provide states private benefits that transform the nature of the good. Using a Heckman selection model, they test for the determinants of state contributions to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and find that refugee protection offers several private benefits, indicating that it is best understood as an impure public good. They conclude, however, that even when states are able to secure these private benefits, it does not necessarily lead to the optimal provision of refugee protection.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven D. Roper & Lilian A. Barria, 2010. "Burden Sharing in the Funding of the UNHCR: Refugee Protection as an Impure Public Good," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(4), pages 616-637, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:54:y:2010:i:4:p:616-637
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002710364131
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jon Echevarria & Javier Gardeazabal, 2016. "Refugee gravitation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(3), pages 269-292, December.
    2. Timothy J. Hatton, 2017. "Refugees and asylum seekers, the crisis in Europe and the future of policy," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 32(91), pages 447-496.
    3. Rossi, Enzo, 2017. "Superseding Dublin: The European asylum system as a non-cooperative game," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 50-59.

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