IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jocore/v26y1982i2p307-327.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Research on Conflict Theory

Author

Listed:
  • Michael D. Intriligator

    (Departments of Economics and Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles)

Abstract

Research on conflict theory, that is, studies of conflict or war using formal reasoning or mathematical approaches, is cross-classified by eight analytic approaches and eight areas of application. The analytic approaches include differential equations, decision theory/control theory, game theory, bargaining theory, uncertainty, stability theory, action-reaction models, and organization theory. The areas of application include arms races, war initiation/war termination/timing of conflict, military strategy/conduct of war, threats/crises/escalation, qualitative arms race/arms control, alliances, nuclear proliferation, and defense bureaucracy/budgets. The use of a particular analytic approach in a particular area of application entails 64 possible combinations, but research tends to cluster in only certain of these cross-classifications.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael D. Intriligator, 1982. "Research on Conflict Theory," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 26(2), pages 307-327, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:26:y:1982:i:2:p:307-327
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002782026002006
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002782026002006
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0022002782026002006?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Todd Sandler & Jon Cauley & John F. Forbes, 1980. "In Defense of a Collective Goods Theory of Alliances," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 24(3), pages 537-547, September.
    2. D. L. Brito & M. D. Intriligator, 1977. "Nuclear Proliferation and the Armaments Race," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 2(2), pages 231-238, February.
    3. Russett, Bruce M. & Sullivan, John D., 1971. "Collective Goods and International Organization," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(4), pages 845-865, October.
    4. Michael Intriligator & Dagobert Brito, 1981. "Nuclear proliferation and the probability of nuclear war," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 247-260, January.
    5. Todd Sandler, 1993. "The Economic Theory of Alliances," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(3), pages 446-483, September.
    6. M. Simaan & J. B. Cruz, 1975. "Formulation of Richardson's Model of Arms Race from a Differential Game Viewpoint," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(1), pages 67-77.
    7. Ostrom, Charles W., 1978. "A Reactive Linkage Model of the U.S. Defense Expenditure Policymaking Process," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 941-957, September.
    8. M. Simaan & J. B. Cruz, Jr., 1975. "Nash Equilibrium Strategies for the Problem of Armament Race and Control," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 22(1), pages 96-105, September.
    9. Todd Sandler, 1977. "Impurity Of Defense: An Application To The Economics Of Alliances," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 443-460, August.
    10. Olson, Mancur, 1971. "Increasing the Incentives for International Cooperation," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(4), pages 866-874, October.
    11. Roland N. McKean, 1967. "Issues in Defense Economics," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number mcke67-1, March.
    12. Gillespie, John V. & Zinnes, Dina A. & Tahim, G.S. & Schrodt, Philip A. & Rubison, R. Michael, 1977. "An Optimal Control Model of Arms Races," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 226-244, March.
    13. Burton Klein, 1962. "The Decision Making Problem in Development," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 477-508, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Doran, Charles F. & Parsons, Wes, 1980. "War and the Cycle of Relative Power," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(4), pages 947-965, December.
    15. Intriligator, Michael D, 1975. "Strategic Considerations in the Richardson Model of Arms Races," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(2), pages 339-353, April.
    16. Brito, Dagobert L & Buoncristiani, A M & Intriligator, M D, 1977. "A New Approach to the Nash Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(5), pages 1163-1172, July.
    17. Brian Healy & Arthur Stein, 1973. "The Balance of Power in International History," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 17(1), pages 33-61, March.
    18. Brito, D L, 1972. "A Dynamic Model of an Armaments Race," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 13(2), pages 359-375, June.
    19. Dagobert Brito & Michael Intriligator, 1981. "Strategic arms limitation treaties and innovations in weapons technology," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 41-59, January.
    20. Coffey, Joseph I., 1971. "Nuclear Guarantees and Nonproliferation," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(4), pages 836-844, October.
    21. McGuire, Martin, 1977. "A Quantitative Study of the Strategic Arms Race in the Missile Age," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 59(3), pages 328-339, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Michael Intriljgator & Dagobert Brito, 2000. "Arms Races," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(1), pages 45-54.
    2. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Theorizing about conflict," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 165-189, Elsevier.
    3. Andreou, Andreas & Zombanakis, George, 2003. "Measuring Relative Military Security," MPRA Paper 78660, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Jul 2003.
    4. A. S. Andreou & G. A. Zombanakis, 2001. "A neural network measurement of relative military security - the case of Greece and Cyprus," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(4), pages 303-324.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Michael P. Leidy & Robert W. Staiger, 1985. "Economic Issues and Methodology in Arms Race Analysis," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 29(3), pages 503-530, September.
    2. Wallace J. Thies, 1987. "Alliances and Collective Goods," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(2), pages 298-332, June.
    3. Charles H. Anderton, 1989. "Arms Race Modeling," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 33(2), pages 346-367, June.
    4. Todd Sandler, 1993. "The Economic Theory of Alliances," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(3), pages 446-483, September.
    5. Michael D. McGinnis, 1991. "Richardson, Rationality, and Restrictive Models of Arms Races," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(3), pages 443-473, September.
    6. Anderton,Charles H. & Carter,John R., 2009. "Principles of Conflict Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521875578, December.
    7. Sandler, Todd & Tschirhart, John T, 1980. "The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1481-1521, December.
    8. Dina A. Zinnes & John V. Gillespie & G. S. Tahim, 1978. "Transforming a Nation-Dominant International System," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 22(4), pages 547-564, December.
    9. Cheng-Te Lee, 2007. "A New Explanation of Arms Races in the Third World: A Differential Game Model," Journal of Economics and Management, College of Business, Feng Chia University, Taiwan, vol. 3(2), pages 161-176, July.
    10. Steven D. Roper & Lilian A. Barria, 2010. "Burden Sharing in the Funding of the UNHCR: Refugee Protection as an Impure Public Good," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(4), pages 616-637, August.
    11. Michael D. Intriligator & Dagobert L. Brito, 1985. "Wolfson on Economic Warfare," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 8(2), pages 21-25, February.
    12. Gong, Liutang & Zou, Heng-fu, 2003. "Military spending and stochastic growth," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 153-170, October.
    13. Mark A. Boyer, 1989. "Trading Public Goods in the Western Alliance System," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 33(4), pages 700-727, December.
    14. Ronen Bar-El & Kobi Kagan & Asher Tishler, 2010. "Forward-Looking versus Shortsighted Defense Budget Allocation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(4), pages 638-662, August.
    15. Carlos Seiglie, 1999. "Altruism, Foreign Aid and Humanitarian Military Intervention," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 17(2), pages 207-223, September.
    16. Dagobert Brito & Michael Intriligator, 1999. "Increasing returns to scale and the arms race: The end of the Richardson paradigm?," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(1), pages 39-54.
    17. Kendall D. Moll & Gregory M. Luebbert, 1980. "Arms Race and Military Expenditure Models," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 24(1), pages 153-185, March.
    18. Deng-Shan Wang & Yan Wang & Yifang Liu & Heng-fu Zou, 2009. "Optimal Military Spending, Trade and Stochastic Economic Growth," CEMA Working Papers 373, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics.
    19. Barry Nalebuff, 1988. "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 32(3), pages 411-425, September.
    20. Coyne,Christopher J., 2020. "Defense, Peace, and War Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108724036.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:26:y:1982:i:2:p:307-327. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://pss.la.psu.edu/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.