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The theory of collective action and burden sharing in NATO

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  • Oneal, John R.

Abstract

Mancur Olson's theory of collective action could account for much of the variance in the defense burdens of the allied nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the early years of the Cold War, but the association between economic size (gross domestic product, or GDP) and defense burden (the ratio of military expenditures to GDP) has declined to insignificant levels. Two influences are shown to be important in producing this change: the increased pursuit of private goods by Greece, Turkey, and Portugal and the growing cooperation among the other European allies. Since cooperation in the military realm has not provided the Europeans with credible means of self-defense, it appears to be a consequence of the general growth of interdependence in Europe during the postwar period. NATO is still essentially a uniquely privileged group producing a relatively pure public good. Accordingly, the theory of collective action continues to provide valuable insights into the operation of the alliance.

Suggested Citation

  • Oneal, John R., 1990. "The theory of collective action and burden sharing in NATO," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 379-402, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:44:y:1990:i:03:p:379-402_03
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    Cited by:

    1. Tony Addison & Mark McGillivray & Matthew Odedokun, 2004. "Donor Funding of Multilateral Aid Agencies: Determining Factors and Revealed Burden Sharing," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 173-191, February.
    2. Bruce Linster & Richard Fullerton & Michael Mckee & Stephen Slate, 2001. "Rent-seeking models of international competition: An experimental investigation," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(4), pages 285-302.
    3. Glenn Palmer & J. Sky David, 1999. "Multiple Goals or Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 43(6), pages 748-770, December.
    4. Steven D. Roper & Lilian A. Barria, 2010. "Burden Sharing in the Funding of the UNHCR: Refugee Protection as an Impure Public Good," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(4), pages 616-637, August.
    5. Renaud Bellais & Martial Foucault & Jean-Michel Oudot, 2014. "Économie de la défense," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01052607, HAL.
    6. Douglas M. Gibler & Scott Wolford, 2006. "Alliances, Then Democracy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(1), pages 129-153, February.
    7. Todd Sandler & James C. Murdoch, 2000. "On sharing NATO defence burdens in the 1990s and beyond," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 21(3), pages 297-327, September.
    8. Minoru Okamura, 2022. "Identifying the public goods allocation process: case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 63(3), pages 1707-1726, September.
    9. John R. Oneal, 1990. "Testing the Theory of Collective Action," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(3), pages 426-448, September.
    10. Todd Sandler, 1993. "The Economic Theory of Alliances," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(3), pages 446-483, September.
    11. Benjamin Zyla, 2018. "Beyond the 2% fetishism: studying the practice of collective action in transatlantic affairs," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 4(1), pages 1-11, December.
    12. William Gates & Katsuaki Terasawa, 2003. "Reconsidering publicness in alliance defence expenditures: NATO expansion and burden sharing," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(5), pages 369-383.
    13. Boadway, Robin & Hayashi, Masayoshi, 1999. "Country size and the voluntary provision of international public goods," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 619-638, November.
    14. Matthew Fuhrmann, 2020. "When Do Leaders Free‐Ride? Business Experience and Contributions to Collective Defense," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(2), pages 416-431, April.

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