Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Outsourcing Military Force: A Transactions Cost Perspective on the Role of Military Companies

Contents:

Author Info

  • Eric Fredland
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Since the mid-1990s, the operations of private, for profit, military companies have been the subject of increased political and media scrutiny. Firms in this industry provide both combat and support functions to sovereign governments. In this paper, the current and potential future role of these companies is examined from the perspective of transactions cost economics. The transactions cost approach suggests that inevitable contractual hazards sharply limit the combat/combat support role of these companies, despite substantial potential cost savings, even for poor countries with weak governments. However, there is a growing market, even in developed countries, for private provision of training and support.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10242690310001623410
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Defence and Peace Economics.

    Volume (Year): 15 (2004)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 205-219

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:15:y:2004:i:3:p:205-219

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/GDPE20

    Order Information:
    Web: http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/GDPE20

    Related research

    Keywords: Private military companies; Transactions cost economics; Economics of national security; JEL Codes: H11; H56; L24;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," NBER Working Papers 5744, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-91, September.
    3. Williamson, Oliver E, 1999. "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 306-42, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Bennedsen, Morten & Schultz, Christian, 2011. "Arm's length delegation of public services," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 543-552.
    2. Morten Bennedsen & Christian Schultz, 2007. "Arm’s Length Provision of Public Services," CESifo Working Paper Series 2161, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. MacDonald, Peter, 2013. "Labour substitution and the scope for military outsourcing," MPRA Paper 46688, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:15:y:2004:i:3:p:205-219. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.