Fiscal decentralization, collusion and government size in China's transitional economy
AbstractThis paper examines the public sector in China's transitional economy, with the aim of testing the validity of a variety of hypotheses, namely the Brennan and Buchanan (1980, The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution, CUP, Cambridge); Oates-Wallis (1985, American Economic Review, 75(4) 748-57) version of the decentralization hypothesis and the Brennan and Buchanan collusion hypothesis, on the impact of fiscal decentralization at the provincial level. Pooled cross-section (province) and time-series data are employed with the period under consideration being 1986-1998. An error components technique is also used for the empirical testing. The empirical results provide evidence to support both the Oates-Wallis hypothesis and the collusion hypothesis that an increase in fiscal decentralization leads to a higher level of provincial government expenditure. The study also finds that the central and provincial governments are provided with an incentive to form collusive agreements through extra-budgetary funds.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Applied Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 11 (2004)
Issue (Month): 11 ()
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