Revealed preferences for car tax cuts: an empirical study of perceived fiscal incidence
AbstractVoting in an election in which elimination of the local car tax is the central issue shows how a highly visible universal tax cut can prevail in the electoral process even if benefits are skewed toward upper income households. These results are consistent with positive models of fiscal structure choice in which fiscal systems are the consequence of support maximizing politicians attempting to supply net benefits to easily identifiable interest groups without generating significant opposition from other groups.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Applied Economics.
Volume (Year): 41 (2009)
Issue (Month): 12 ()
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Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/RAEC20
Other versions of this item:
- David H Feldman & Samuel H Baker, 2004. "Revealed Preferences for Car Tax Cuts: an Empirical Study of Perceived Fiscal Incidence," Public Economics 0411002, EconWPA.
- Samuel A. Baker & David H. Feldman, 2004. "Revealed Preference for Car Tax Cuts: An Empirical Study of Perceived Fiscal Incidence," Working Papers 08, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
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