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Time-Consistent Polities and Growth in Developing Countries: An Empirical Analysis

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  • James L. Butkiewicz

    ()

  • Halit Yanikkaya

Abstract

Property rights are known to promote economic growth. Durable political regimes, regardless of type, can create stable environments that facilitate growth. Polity stability has an effect similar to property rights, promoting investment enhancing growth. Examination of the growth effects of regime stability finds that stable polities are important for growth in autocracies, but not democracies. That regime stability is not important for democracies indicates that parameter heterogeneity can be important when estimating empirical growth models. Not just democracies, but also stable autocracies with predictable rules-of-the-game create positive environments for economic growth.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of World Economics.

Volume (Year): 143 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
Pages: 306-323

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Handle: RePEc:spr:weltar:v:143:y:2007:i:2:p:306-323

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Keywords: Property rights; stability; growth; democracy; autocracy;

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Cited by:
  1. James L. Butkiewicz & Halit Yanikkaya, 2011. "Institutions and the impact of government spending on growth," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 319-341, November.
  2. Lawrence King & Osvaldo Gómez Martínez, 2010. "Property Rights Reform and Development: A Critique of the Cross-National Regression Literature," Working Papers wp216, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.

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