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Betriebliche Altersversorgung über Direktzusagen – privilegiert oder diskriminiert?
[Employer-sponsored Direct Benefits—Pain or Gain?]

Author

Listed:
  • Dirk Kiesewetter

    (Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg)

  • Uwe Schätzlein

    (Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Einkommensteuerrechtlich ist der Rechnungszins zur Diskontierung von Pensionsverpflichtungen mit 6 % typisiert, was weit über dem aktuellen Marktzinsniveau liegt. Gegenüber anderen Durchführungswegen der betrieblichen Altersversorgung, die einen steuerfreien Aufbau eines Deckungsstocks ermöglichen, gilt die Direktzusage damit als systematisch im Nachteil. Eine Reform von § 6a des Einkommensteuergesetzes wird daher erwartet. Dieser Beitrag verdeutlicht das Problem und untersucht dann für ausgewählte Reformalternativen, welche Entscheidungs- und Belastungswirkungen sich daraus für Unternehmen ergeben, die Leistungszusagen als Direktzusagen erteilt haben oder dies künftig planen. Die Reformalternativen unterscheiden sich im Ausmaß der Einmalentlastung im Reformzeitpunkt, aber auch in der verbleibenden Finanzierungslücke für in der Vergangenheit erteilte Zusagen. Der steuerfreie Aufbau eines Deckungsstocks zur Bedienung der Verpflichtungen gelingt hier in keinem Fall.

Suggested Citation

  • Dirk Kiesewetter & Uwe Schätzlein, 2019. "Betriebliche Altersversorgung über Direktzusagen – privilegiert oder diskriminiert? [Employer-sponsored Direct Benefits—Pain or Gain?]," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 71(3), pages 313-346, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:71:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s41471-019-00074-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s41471-019-00074-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Evsey D. Domar & Richard A. Musgrave, 1944. "Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-Taking," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 58(3), pages 388-422.
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