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Resisting democracy assistance: Who seeks and receives technical election assistance?

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  • Inken von Borzyskowski

    (Florida State University)

Abstract

Why are some developing countries less open to technical election assistance than to election observation? My argument about who seeks and receives technical election assistance is two-fold, taking into account the incentives of recipients and providers. On the recipient side, governments are less likely to request technical assistance when the political costs are high (autocracy) or the benefits low (strong electoral institutions). On the provider side, international organizations are less likely to provide such technical assistance when the government appears to lack political will for reform and full project implementation is unlikely. Statistical analyses of global data on technical election assistance by the United Nations covering 130 countries from 1990 to 2003 support this argument about political cost-benefit calculations in considering technical assistance. Case examples from Guyana, Indonesia, Haiti, and Venezuela illustrate some of these dynamics. My findings suggest that seemingly complementary international interventions (observation and technical support) can create different incentives for domestic and international actors. This helps explain why some countries tend to agree more often to election observation than to technical election assistance.

Suggested Citation

  • Inken von Borzyskowski, 2016. "Resisting democracy assistance: Who seeks and receives technical election assistance?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 247-282, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:11:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s11558-016-9249-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-016-9249-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Hannah Smidt, 2021. "Keeping electoral peace? Activities of United Nations peacekeeping operations and their effects on election-related violence," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(5), pages 580-604, September.
    2. Axel Dreher & Sarah Langlotz & Silvia Marchesi, 2017. "Information Transmission And Ownership Consolidation In Aid Programs," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1671-1688, October.
    3. Inken Borzyskowski, 2019. "Paul Poast and Johannes Urpelainen. 2018. Organizing Democracy: How International Organizations Assist New Democracies (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press)," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 577-580, September.
    4. Tobias Heinrich & Matt W. Loftis, 2019. "Democracy Aid and Electoral Accountability," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 63(1), pages 139-166, January.
    5. John W. McArthur & Eric Werker, 2016. "Developing countries and international organizations: Introduction to the special issue," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 155-169, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    International organizations; United Nations; Developing countries; Elections; Democracy promotion; Technical election assistance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations

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