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The corporate headquarters in organization design theory: an organizational economics perspective

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  • Nicolai J. Foss

    (Bocconi University)

Abstract

The corporate headquarters (CHQ) is an important part of the organization of large firms; yet, it is neglected in organization design theory. In this brief essay, I argue that we need a better understanding of the CHQ to further our understanding of the link between the top-management team and the rest of the organization, and to improve our understanding of the costs and benefits of hierarchical organization in general. I outline a number of organizational economics ideas that may help addressing these challenges.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolai J. Foss, 2019. "The corporate headquarters in organization design theory: an organizational economics perspective," Journal of Organization Design, Springer;Organizational Design Community, vol. 8(1), pages 1-9, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jorgde:v:8:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1186_s41469-019-0048-7
    DOI: 10.1186/s41469-019-0048-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Guerras-Martín, Luis Ángel & Ronda-Pupo, Guillermo Armando & Zúñiga-Vicente, José Ángel & Benito-Osorio, Diana, 2020. "Half a century of research on corporate diversification: A new comprehensive framework," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 124-141.
    2. Jaeho Kim & Andy Wu, 2019. "Extending the role of headquarters beyond the firm boundary: entrepreneurial alliance innovation," Journal of Organization Design, Springer;Organizational Design Community, vol. 8(1), pages 1-35, December.
    3. Sven Kunisch & Markus Menz & David Collis, 2020. "Corporate headquarters in the twenty-first century: an organization design perspective," Journal of Organization Design, Springer;Organizational Design Community, vol. 9(1), pages 1-32, December.
    4. De Beule, Filip & Elia, Stefano & Garcia-Bernardo, Javier & Heemskerk, Eelke M. & Jaklič, Andreja & Takes, Frank W. & Zdziarski, Michal, 2022. "Proximity at a distance: The relationship between foreign subsidiary co-location and MNC headquarters board interlock formation," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(4).
    5. Randi Lunnan & Sverre Tomassen & Ulf Andersson & Gabriel R. G. Benito, 2019. "Dealing with headquarters in the multinational corporation: a subsidiary perspective on organizing costs," Journal of Organization Design, Springer;Organizational Design Community, vol. 8(1), pages 1-24, December.
    6. Henrik Dellestrand & Philip Kappen & Olof Lindahl, 2020. "Headquarter resource allocation strategies and subsidiary competitive or cooperative behavior: achieving a fit for value creation," Journal of Organization Design, Springer;Organizational Design Community, vol. 9(1), pages 1-16, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    D21; D23; M1; M2;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • M1 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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