Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Un modèle renouvelé de gouvernance d'entreprise : une évaluation empirique sur données françaises

Contents:

Author Info

  • Cécile Cézanne

    ()
    (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - Université Paris-Nord - Paris XIII - CNRS : UMR7234)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This article has a dual purpose. On the one hand, it proposes a renewed analysis of the governance of specific human capital-intensive firms. On the other hand, it empirically estimates the nature of the corresponding operational model in France at the beginning of the 2000s. Actually, for nearly two decades, the firm has changed, especially with the growing importance of human capital in the value creation process. This evolution raises questions about the necessity to revisit firm governance. Considering that the very first mission of a large number of firms is to retain and to accumulate specific skills, we propose that a composite model that we call the "multi-resource" model offirm governance has to be outlined. Firstly, we analytically show that this latter aims at motivating key partners at work through the simultaneous use of individualized incentive tools and horizontal coordinative mechanisms. Secondly, we give an original empirical exploitation of the "Employer" part of the REPONSE 2004-2005 survey to test the hypothesis that such a governance system is implemented by some French firms.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/62/86/50/PDF/Un_modA_le_renouvelA_de_GE-Une_A_valuation_empirique_sur_donnA_es_franA_aises_revised_draft.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00628650.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: 01 Aug 2010
    Date of revision:
    Publication status: Published, Revue d'Economie Politique, 2010, 120, 4, 669-700
    Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00628650

    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00628650/en/
    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

    Related research

    Keywords: specific human capital; multi-resource firm governance; horizontalisation of coordination; reponse 2004-2005; verticalisation of incentives;

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Oyer, Paul & Schaefer, Scott, 2004. "Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options To All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories," Research Papers 1772r, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    2. Murphy, Kevin J., 2003. "Stock-based pay in new economy firms," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1-3), pages 129-147, January.
    3. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2000. "The Governance of the New Enterprise," NBER Working Papers 7958, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December.
    5. Cecile Cezanne-Sintes, 2008. "Modern corporate changes: reinstating the link between the nature, boundaries and governance of the firm," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(4), pages 447-461.
    6. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Johnson, Joanne & Baldwin, John R., 1995. "Developpement du capital humain et innovation : la formation dans les petites et moyennes entreprises," Direction des etudes analytiques : documents de recherche 1995074f, Statistics Canada, Direction des etudes analytiques.
    8. Raghuram G. Rajan & Julie Wulf, 2006. "The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(4), pages 759-773, November.
    9. Gérard Charreaux, 2001. "Variation sur le thème 'A la recherche de nouvelles fondations pour la finance et la gouvernance d'entreprise'," Working Papers CREGO 011201, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations, revised Jul 2002.
    10. Peter Cappelli & David Neumark, 2001. "Do "high-performance" work practices improve establishment-level outcomes?," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 54(4), pages 737-775, July.
    11. Bengt Holmstrom & John Roberts, 1998. "The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 73-94, Fall.
    12. Core, John E. & Guay, Wayne R., 2001. "Stock option plans for non-executive employees," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 253-287, August.
    13. Van Reenen, John & Caroli, Eve, 2001. "Skill-Biased Organizational Change? Evidence from a panel of British and French establishments," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/10093, Paris Dauphine University.
    14. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," NBER Working Papers 9784, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 5554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Gibbons, Robert, 2005. "Four forma(lizable) theories of the firm?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 200-245, October.
    17. Nathalie Greenan & Jacques Mairesse, 2006. "Les changements organisationnels, l'informatisation des entreprises et le travail des salariés. Un exercice de mesure à partir de données couplées entreprises/salariés," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(6), pages 1137-1175.
    18. Francis Green, 2002. "Why Has Work Effort Become More Intense?," Studies in Economics 0207, Department of Economics, University of Kent.
    19. Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss & Xosé H. Vázquez, 2006. "'Tying the manager's hands': constraining opportunistic managerial intervention," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(5), pages 797-818, September.
    20. Bernard Guilhon, 2004. "Markets for knowledge: problems, scope, and economic implications," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(2), pages 165-181.
    21. Suzanne Konzelmann & Neil Conway & Linda Trenberth & Frank Wilkinson, 2006. "Corporate Governance and Human Resource Management," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 44(3), pages 541-567, 09.
    22. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 49-70, Summer.
    23. Paul Osterman, 1994. "How common is workplace transformation and who adopts it?," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 47(2), pages 173-188, January.
    24. Philippe Askenazy, 2005. "Sur les sources de l'intensification," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 56(2), pages 217-236.
    25. Cécile Cézanne-Sintès, 2008. "Modern Corporate Changes: Reinstating the Link between the Nature, Boundaries and Governance of the Firm," Post-Print hal-00367732, HAL.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00628650. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.