IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jogath/v51y2022i2d10.1007_s00182-021-00793-x.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Lipschitz constant of perturbed anonymous games

Author

Listed:
  • Ron Peretz

    (Bar-Ilan University)

  • Amnon Schreiber

    (Bar-Ilan University)

  • Ernst Schulte-Geers

    (Federal Office for Information Security)

Abstract

The Lipschitz constant of a game measures the maximal amount of influence that one player has on the payoff of some other player. The worst-case Lipschitz constant of an n-player k-action $$\delta $$ δ -perturbed game, $$\lambda (n,k,\delta )$$ λ ( n , k , δ ) , is given an explicit probabilistic description. In the case of $$k\ge 3$$ k ≥ 3 , it is identified with the passage probability of a certain symmetric random walk on $${\mathbb {Z}}$$ Z . In the case of $$k=2$$ k = 2 and n even, $$\lambda (n,2,\delta )$$ λ ( n , 2 , δ ) is identified with the probability that two i.i.d. binomial random variables are equal. The remaining case, $$k=2$$ k = 2 and n odd, is bounded through the adjacent (even) values of n. Our characterization implies a sharp closed-form asymptotic estimate of $$\lambda (n,k,\delta )$$ λ ( n , k , δ ) as $$\delta n /k\rightarrow \infty $$ δ n / k → ∞ .

Suggested Citation

  • Ron Peretz & Amnon Schreiber & Ernst Schulte-Geers, 2022. "The Lipschitz constant of perturbed anonymous games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(2), pages 293-306, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:51:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-021-00793-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00793-x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-021-00793-x
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00182-021-00793-x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. SCHMEIDLER, David, 1973. "Equilibrium points of nonatomic games," LIDAM Reprints CORE 146, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Deb, Joyee & Kalai, Ehud, 2015. "Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1041-1055.
    3. Gradwohl, Ronen & Reingold, Omer, 2010. "Partial exposure in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 602-613, March.
    4. Ehud Kalai, 2004. "Large Robust Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(6), pages 1631-1665, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Carmona, Guilherme & Podczeck, Konrad, 2020. "Pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games and their relationship to non-atomic games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    2. Yang, Jian, 2022. "A Bayesian nonatomic game and its applicability to finite-player situations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    3. Yaron Azrieli & Eran Shmaya, 2013. "Lipschitz Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 38(2), pages 350-357, May.
    4. Deb, Joyee & Kalai, Ehud, 2015. "Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1041-1055.
    5. Kalai, Ehud & Shmaya, Eran, 2018. "Large strategic dynamic interactions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 59-81.
    6. Al-Najjar, Nabil I., 2008. "Large games and the law of large numbers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 1-34, September.
    7. Hannu Salonen, 2010. "On the existence of Nash equilibria in large games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(3), pages 351-357, July.
    8. Wang, Yan & Yang, Jian & Qi, Lian, 2017. "A game-theoretic model for the role of reputation feedback systems in peer-to-peer commerce," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 178-193.
    9. Yang, Jian, 2011. "Asymptotic interpretations for equilibria of nonatomic games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 491-499.
    10. Carmona, Guilherme & Podczeck, Konrad, 2009. "On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1300-1319, May.
    11. Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2009. "On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(1), pages 137-153, March.
    12. Chen, Enxian & Qiao, Lei & Sun, Xiang & Sun, Yeneng, 2022. "Robust perfect equilibrium in large games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    13. Lydia T. Liu & Ashia Wilson & Nika Haghtalab & Adam Tauman Kalai & Christian Borgs & Jennifer Chayes, 2019. "The Disparate Equilibria of Algorithmic Decision Making when Individuals Invest Rationally," Papers 1910.04123, arXiv.org.
    14. Georgy Artemov & Yeon-Koo Che & YingHua He, 2023. "Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents," Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(2), pages 270-320.
    15. Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2009. "On purification of equilibrium in Bayesian games and expost Nash equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(1), pages 127-136, March.
    16. Wooders, Myrna & Cartwright, Edward & Selten, Reinhard, 2006. "Behavioral conformity in games with many players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 347-360, November.
    17. Saif Benjaafar & Harald Bernhard & Costas Courcoubetis & Michail Kanakakis & Spyridon Papafragkos, 2022. "Drivers, Riders, and Service Providers: The Impact of the Sharing Economy on Mobility," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(1), pages 123-142, January.
    18. Gradwohl, Ronen & Reingold, Omer, 2010. "Partial exposure in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 602-613, March.
    19. Gradwohl, Ronen & Reingold, Omer, 2014. "Fault tolerance in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 438-457.
    20. Jian Yang, 2017. "A link between sequential semi-anonymous nonatomic games and their large finite counterparts," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 383-433, May.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:51:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-021-00793-x. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.