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Fault tolerance in large games

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  • Gradwohl, Ronen
  • Reingold, Omer

Abstract

A Nash equilibrium is an optimal strategy for each player under the assumption that others play according to their respective Nash strategies, but it provides no guarantees in the presence of irrational players or coalitions of colluding players. In fact, no such guarantees exist in general. However, in this paper we show that large games are innately fault tolerant. We quantify the ways in which two subclasses of large games – λ-continuous games and anonymous games – are resilient against Byzantine faults (i.e. irrational behavior), coalitions, and asynchronous play. We also show that general large games have some non-trivial resilience against faults.

Suggested Citation

  • Gradwohl, Ronen & Reingold, Omer, 2014. "Fault tolerance in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 438-457.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:86:y:2014:i:c:p:438-457
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Gradwohl, Ronen & Reingold, Omer, 2010. "Partial exposure in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 602-613, March.
    5. Monderer, Dov & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 1999. "Distributed Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 55-72, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Duk Gyoo Kim & Daehong Min & John Wooders, 2022. "Viable Nash Equilibria: An Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series 9913, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nash equilibrium; Large games; Fault tolerance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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