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Self-recognition in teams

Author

Listed:
  • Joshua S. Gans

    (University of Toronto
    NBER)

  • Peter Landry

    (University of Toronto)

Abstract

This paper studies an idea we call “(null) self-recognition,” which occurs when a player who was certain that they were a particular type privately discovers that they are in fact some other type. To address unresolved questions as to how players update their beliefs regarding their partner’s type and higher-order beliefs regarding both players’ types after self-recognition, we propose a “sequential reassessment” rule, in which beliefs concerning each player’s type are modified up to a given order. As an initial investigation of its equilibrium consequences, we embed sequential reassessment in a simple model of team production, in which players experience self-recognition when game play begins. Our main result, which applies for team projects with uneven task demands, shows how a player’s decision to work or shirk can depend solely on whether that player’s reassessment of their own type is “deeper” or “shallower” than their reassessment of their partner’s type.

Suggested Citation

  • Joshua S. Gans & Peter Landry, 2019. "Self-recognition in teams," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1169-1201, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:48:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-019-00683-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-019-00683-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gans, Joshua S. & Landry, Peter, 2022. "I’m not sure what to think about them: Confronting naive present bias in a dynamic threshold public goods game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 195-204.
    2. Yixuan Shi, 2022. "Dynamic Volunteer’s Dilemma with Procrastinators," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2022-17, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    3. Marco A. Haan & Dominic Hauck, 2023. "Games with possibly naive present-biased players," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 95(2), pages 173-203, August.

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