Procrastination, partial naivete, and behavioral welfare analysis
AbstractThis paper has a dual purpose. First, I present a new modeling of partial naivete, and apply this to the analysis of procrastination. The decision maker is assumed to have stationary behavior and to be partially naive in the sense of perceiving that his current preferences may persist in the future. The behavioral implications of such partial naivete differ from those of related literature. Second, I suggest a general principle for welfare analysis in multi-self settings through a new application of Pareto-dominance, which is motivated by the existence of time-inconsistency and coincides with dominance relations used elsewhere in game theory. In the case of procrastination, it leads to a clear welfare conclusion: Being partially naive reduces welfare.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 02/2007.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 01 Feb 2007
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
More information through EDIRC
Procrastination; partial naivete; time-inconsistency; game theory; behavioral welfare economics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - Intertemporal Household Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
- E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
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