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Non-cooperative Implementation of the Nucleolus: The 3-Player Case

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  • Serrano, Roberto

Abstract

I present a non-cooperative bargaining game, in which responders may exit at any time and have endogenous outside options. When the order of proposers corresponds to the power that players have in the underlying coalitional function, the unique Markov perfect equilibrium outcome of the game is the prenucleolus. The result holds for 3-player superadditive games. An example shows that it cannot be extended to the same class of games for n players. The mechanism is inspired by the consistency property of the prenucleolus.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 22 (1993)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 345-57

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:22:y:1993:i:4:p:345-57

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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm

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Cited by:
  1. Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
  2. Joosung Lee, 2013. "Bargaining and Buyout," 2013 Papers ple701, Job Market Papers.
  3. Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  4. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1999. "Bargaining and Bargaining Sets," Working Papers 99-18, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  5. Serrano, Roberto, 1997. "Reinterpreting the Kernel," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 58-80, November.
  6. Gustavo Bergantiños & Luciano Méndez-Naya, 2000. "Implementation of the τ-value," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 31-41, June.
  7. Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2009. "A multi-agent bilateral bargaining model with endogenous protocol," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 203-226, August.
  8. Serrano, Roberto, 1995. "Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 319-329.
  9. Rebelo, S., 1997. "On the Determinant of Economic Growth," RCER Working Papers 443, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  10. Bergin, James & Duggan, John, 1999. "An Implementation-Theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 50-76, May.

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