Non-cooperative Implementation of the Nucleolus: The 3-Player Case
AbstractI present a non-cooperative bargaining game, in which responders may exit at any time and have endogenous outside options. When the order of proposers corresponds to the power that players have in the underlying coalitional function, the unique Markov perfect equilibrium outcome of the game is the prenucleolus. The result holds for 3-player superadditive games. An example shows that it cannot be extended to the same class of games for n players. The mechanism is inspired by the consistency property of the prenucleolus.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 22 (1993)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Roberto Serrano, 2004.
"Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003,"
2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Jackson, Matthew O., 1999.
"A Crash Course in Implementation Theory,"
1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Bergin, James & Duggan, John, 1999. "An Implementation-Theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 50-76, May.
- Gustavo Bergantiños & Luciano Méndez-Naya, 2000. "Implementation of the τ-value," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 31-41, June.
- Serrano, Roberto, 1995. "Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 319-329.
- Le Breton, Michel & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2013. "Alliances Electorales entre Deux Tours de Scrutin : Le Point de Vue de la Théorie des Jeux Coopératifs et une Application aux Elections Régionales de Mars 2010," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
- Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2009. "A multi-agent bilateral bargaining model with endogenous protocol," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 203-226, August.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1999.
"Bargaining and Bargaining Sets,"
99-18, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Rebelo, S., 1997. "On the Determinant of Economic Growth," RCER Working Papers 443, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Serrano, Roberto, 1997. "Reinterpreting the Kernel," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 58-80, November.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.