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Endogenously determined price rigidities (*)

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  • P. Jean-Jacques Herings

    (Department of Econometrics and CentER, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, THE NETHERLANDS)

Abstract

There exists an extensive literature about economies with price rigidities, where some constraints on the set of admissible price systems are exogenously given. In this paper a general equilibrium model extended by a political system is described where the price rigidities are endogenously chosen by political candidates. Sufficient conditions for the existence of a mixed strategy and a pure strategy equilibrium are given. Finally an example is discussed, where in equilibrium both political candidates propose price rigidities excluding the Walrasian equilibrium price system.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 9 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 471-498

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:9:y:1997:i:3:p:471-498

Note: Received: September 15, 1994; revised version October 18, 1995
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  1. Silvestre, Joaquim, 1988. "Undominated prices in the three good model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 161-178, January.
  2. Benassy Jean-pascal, 1974. "Neokeynesian disequilibrium theory in a monetary economy," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 7402, CEPREMAP.
  3. Kramer, Gerald H, 1973. "On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(2), pages 285-97, March.
  4. Dreze, Jacques H, 1975. "Existence of an Exchange Equilibrium under Price Rigidities," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 16(2), pages 301-20, June.
  5. Coughlin, Peter J & Mueller, Dennis C & Murrell, Peter, 1990. "Electoral Politics, Interest Groups, and the Size of Government," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(4), pages 682-705, October.
  6. Melvin Hinich & Peter Ordeshook, 1971. "Social welfare and electoral competition in democratic societies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 73-87, September.
  7. Ginsburgh, Victor A. & Van der Heyden, Ludo, 1988. "On extending the negishi approach to computing equilibria: The case of government price support policies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 168-178, February.
  8. Coughlin, Peter & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1981. "Directional and local electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 226-239, April.
  9. Hart, Oliver, 1982. "A Model of Imperfect Competition with Keynesian Features," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(1), pages 109-38, February.
  10. Debreu, Gerard, 1974. "Excess demand functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 15-21, March.
  11. Coughlin, Peter & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1981. "Electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and Nash social welfare maxima," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 113-121, February.
  12. Cox, Charles C, 1980. "The Enforcement of Public Price Controls," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(5), pages 887-916, October.
  13. Nguyen, Trien T. & Whalley, John, 1986. "Equilibrium under price controls with endogenous transactions costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 290-300, August.
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Cited by:
  1. Talman,Dolf & Laan,Gerard,van der & Herings,P. Jean-Jacques, 2001. "Quantity Constrained Equilibria," Research Memorandum 012, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  2. Vasil'ev, Valery & Wiesmeth, Hans, 2008. "Equilibrium in a mixed economy of arrow-debreu type," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 132-147, January.
  3. Herings,P. Jean-Jacques & Konovalov,Alexander, 2000. "Constrained Suboptimality when Prices Are Non-competitive," Research Memorandum 012, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  4. Tuinstra, Jan, 2000. "The emergence of political business cycles in a two-sector general equilibrium model," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 509-534, September.

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