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To Three or Not to Three?

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  • Tony Caporale
  • Trevor Collier

Abstract

Empirically estimating managerial performance is often quite challenging. Without accurate measurement of managerial output or value added it is difficult to usefully analyze the labor market for managers. This paper uses shot selection between two-point and three-point shots to develop a measure of managerial productivity in the National Basketball Association (NBA). We test whether our measure significantly impacts firm (team) output (wins) and whether this managerial productivity measure is significant in explaining labor market outcomes. We show that managerial performance does, in fact, positively impact team performance and also helps explain differences in managerial compensation. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Tony Caporale & Trevor Collier, 2015. "To Three or Not to Three?," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 1-8, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jlabre:v:36:y:2015:i:1:p:1-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s12122-014-9193-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Managerial performance; Labor markets; National Basketball Association; C23; D22; J44; L83;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism

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