Internal Market Failure: A Framework for Diagnosing Firm Inefficiency
AbstractThe theory of market and government failure can be used to diagnose inefficiency within firms and to identify strategies to deal with these problems. Internal market failures (IMFs) - internal public good problems, internal negative and positive externalities, internal information asymmetries, internal monopolies, the presence of uncertainty - create inefficiencies within firms just as they do in normal markets. As well, self-interested behaviour by executives and internal interest groups (rent-seeking) are analogous to government, or governance, failures (IGFs). Associated with many of these internal market failure problems are generic solutions that can usefully inform executives in their efforts to improve efficiency within the firm. Internal governance failures, in contrast, normally require action by shareholders and boards of directors. Copyright 2003 Blackwell Publishing Ltd..
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Management Studies.
Volume (Year): 40 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (03)
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