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A traffic congestion analysis by user equilibrium and system optimum with incomplete information

Author

Listed:
  • Qiang Zhang

    (Fuzhou University)

  • Shi Qiang Liu

    (Fuzhou University)

  • Mahmoud Masoud

    (Queensland University of Technology)

Abstract

Nowadays, the rapid development of intelligent navigation systems has profound impacts on the routing of traffic users. With the assistance of these intelligent navigation systems, traffic users can obtain more accurate information about a traffic network such as traffic capacities, feasible paths, congestion status, etc. In this paper, we focus on a game-theory-based traffic congestion analysis model which considers incomplete traffic information (e.g., variabilities of path information) generated by intelligent navigation systems. The variabilities of path information are treated as incomplete information associated with different subsets of arcs. We adopt the notions of user equilibrium with incomplete information (UEII) and system optimum with incomplete information (SOII) in this study. Based on these two new notions, we extend two classical theorems and combine them into a new model to analyze the relationship between UEII and SOII. Finally, numerical cases are given to illustrate the implication of UEII and SOII in practical implementations.

Suggested Citation

  • Qiang Zhang & Shi Qiang Liu & Mahmoud Masoud, 2022. "A traffic congestion analysis by user equilibrium and system optimum with incomplete information," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 43(5), pages 1391-1404, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jcomop:v:43:y:2022:i:5:d:10.1007_s10878-020-00663-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s10878-020-00663-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Qiang Zhang & Shi Qiang Liu & Andrea D’Ariano, 2023. "Bi-objective bi-level optimization for integrating lane-level closure and reversal in redesigning transportation networks," Operational Research, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 1-51, June.

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