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Bounding the efficiency of road pricing

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  • Yang, Hai
  • Xu, Wei
  • Heydecker, Benjamin
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Abstract

This paper deals with the following question associated with congestion pricing in a general network with either fixed or elastic travel demand: what is the maximum efficiency loss of a general second-best pricing scheme due to inexact marginal-cost pricing in comparison with the first-best pricing or system optimum case? A formal answer to this question is provided by establishing an inefficiency bound associated with a given road pricing scheme. An application of the methods is provided for the practical trial-and-error implementation of marginal-cost pricing with unknown demand functions.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review.

Volume (Year): 46 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 90-108

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Handle: RePEc:eee:transe:v:46:y:2010:i:1:p:90-108

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Keywords: Nash game Inefficiency Congestion pricing Traffic equilibria;

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Cited by:
  1. Feng, Zengzhe & Gao, Ziyou & Sun, Huijun, 2014. "Bounding the inefficiency of atomic splittable selfish traffic equilibria with elastic demands," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 31-43.
  2. Liu, Tian-Liang & Chen, Jian & Huang, Hai-Jun, 2011. "Existence and efficiency of oligopoly equilibrium under toll and capacity competition," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 908-919.

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