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Bad vibrations: new evidence on commons quality and localism at California’s surf breaks

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  • Franklin Mixon

Abstract

This study extends prior empirical research on issues associated with the common-pool resource represented by California’s surf breaks by (1) expanding the test area to include all of the state’s surf breaks, (2) exploring additional aspects of surf break quality, (3) redefining “access” to the surf breaks by would-be users, and (4) re-examining linear restrictions present in prior empirical modeling. The results presented in this study are perhaps even more striking than those from prior research—indicating that marginal increases in surf break quality lead to relatively large increases in the probability of observing fierce localism at surf breaks. Results also indicate that localism is heightened along the surf breaks of Central California, an area previously unstudied. Although this study focuses on the relationship between surf break quality and localism, its findings offer greater understanding of the general importance of informal property rights protection of common-pool resources. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

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  • Franklin Mixon, 2014. "Bad vibrations: new evidence on commons quality and localism at California’s surf breaks," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 61(4), pages 379-397, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:61:y:2014:i:4:p:379-397
    DOI: 10.1007/s12232-014-0205-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    2. Daniel T. Kaffine, 2009. "Quality and the Commons: The Surf Gangs of California," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(4), pages 727-743, November.
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    5. Rider, Robert, 1998. "Hangin' Ten: The Common-Pool Resource Problem of Surfing," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(1-2), pages 49-64, October.
    6. Cole,Daniel H., 2002. "Pollution and Property," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521001090.
    7. Anthony Scott, 1955. "The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63, pages 116-116.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Franklin G. Mixon & Chandini Sankaran, 2019. "Men in Grey Suits: Shark Activity and Congestion of the Surfing Commons," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(11), pages 1-15, June.
    2. Chávez, Carlos A. & Murphy, James J. & Quezada, Felipe J. & Stranlund, John K., 2023. "The endogenous formation of common pool resource coalitions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 211(C), pages 82-102.
    3. Franklin G. Mixon & Steven B. Caudill, 2018. "Guarding giants: resource commons quality and informal property rights in big-wave surfing," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 54(4), pages 1697-1715, June.
    4. Franklin G. Mixon, 2018. "Camaraderie, common pool congestion, and the optimal size of surf gangs," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 381-396, November.
    5. Martin Rode, 2022. "The institutional foundations of surf break governance in Atlantic Europe," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(1), pages 175-204, January.
    6. Buckley, R.C. & Guitart, D. & Shakeela, A., 2017. "Contested surf tourism resources in the Maldives," Annals of Tourism Research, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 185-199.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Common-pool resources; Informal property rights; Resource quality; Property rights enforcement; K11; Q21;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • Q21 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices

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