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Public Economies and the Endogenous Choice of Institutions

Author

Listed:
  • Eduardo Zambrano

    (California Polytechnic State University)

  • Patrick Holder

    (The Brattle Group)

Abstract

In this paper we provide a framework in which to formalize the seminal work of Elinor Ostrom on the study of public economies, a prominent theoretical construct aimed at providing answers to the following questions: (1) why are some societies able to solve their collective action problems and others are not? and (2) why do societies choose the particular institutions they choose from a vast array of possible choices?

Suggested Citation

  • Eduardo Zambrano & Patrick Holder, 2018. "Public Economies and the Endogenous Choice of Institutions," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 185-206, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:homoec:v:35:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s41412-018-0075-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s41412-018-0075-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public economies; Institutional design; Collective action;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General

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