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Cost allocation under competition: a new rail access charging policy

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  • Martin Savelsbergh

    (Georgia Institute of Technology)

  • Masoud Talebian

    (Sharif University of Technology)

Abstract

We consider a setting in which a rail infrastructure provider divides the track costs proportionally between the above-rail operators based on their usage. We study a proposed access charge regime aimed at incentivizing the operators to use longer train configurations. The regime sets a target length and gives a discount on an operator’s charge if it deploys a configuration of at least the target. That is, the operators may be able to reduce their access charges by deploying a longer train configuration. We analyze the policy, and conditions under which both operators have an incentive to deploy long train configurations.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Savelsbergh & Masoud Talebian, 2019. "Cost allocation under competition: a new rail access charging policy," EURO Journal on Transportation and Logistics, Springer;EURO - The Association of European Operational Research Societies, vol. 8(5), pages 511-534, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:eurjtl:v:8:y:2019:i:5:d:10.1007_s13676-018-0133-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s13676-018-0133-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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