IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/eurjdp/v8y2020i3d10.1007_s40070-020-00114-9.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Effects of information presentation on regulatory decisions for products of biotechnology

Author

Listed:
  • Rim Lassoued

    (University of Saskatchewan)

  • Hayley Hesseln

    (University of Saskatchewan)

  • Peter W. B. Phillips

    (University of Saskatchewan)

  • Stuart J. Smyth

    (University of Saskatchewan)

Abstract

Experts and laypeople often have to make judgements based on a large body of evidence that is uncertain and inconclusive. Theory suggests people are likely to modify their decisions according to how information is framed and structured. This study assesses the effect of information form (text versus numerical) and sequence (bundled versus non-bundled) on decision outcomes regarding the regulation of plants with novel traits. Both experts and laypersons were surveyed and offered one of eight different treatments that tested for the effect of information presentation, the effect of the assigned decision role (as an individual or a member of a decision committee), and the structure of the decision itself. Results show that non-experts are more prone than experts to change their decisions when faced with different structures or decision architectures, especially when the form of information changes.

Suggested Citation

  • Rim Lassoued & Hayley Hesseln & Peter W. B. Phillips & Stuart J. Smyth, 2020. "Effects of information presentation on regulatory decisions for products of biotechnology," EURO Journal on Decision Processes, Springer;EURO - The Association of European Operational Research Societies, vol. 8(3), pages 151-175, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:eurjdp:v:8:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s40070-020-00114-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s40070-020-00114-9
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40070-020-00114-9
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s40070-020-00114-9?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Izak Benbasat & Albert S. Dexter, 1985. "An Experimental Evaluation of Graphical and Color-Enhanced Information Presentation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(11), pages 1348-1364, November.
    2. Lucia Savadori & Stefania Savio & Eraldo Nicotra & Rino Rumiati & Melissa Finucane & Paul Slovic, 2004. "Expert and Public Perception of Risk from Biotechnology," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 24(5), pages 1289-1299, October.
    3. Painton, Scott & Gentry, James W, 1985. "Another Look at the Impact of Information Presentation Format," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 12(2), pages 240-244, September.
    4. Tamar Kugler & Edgar E. Kausel & Martin G. Kocher, 2012. "Are Groups more Rational than Individuals? A Review of Interactive Decision Making in Groups," CESifo Working Paper Series 3701, CESifo.
    5. Schkade, David A. & Kleinmuntz, Don N., 1994. "Information Displays and Choice Processes: Differential Effects of Organization, Form, and Sequence," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 319-337, March.
    6. Konstantinos V. Katsikopoulos, 2011. "Psychological Heuristics for Making Inferences: Definition, Performance, and the Emerging Theory and Practice," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 8(1), pages 10-29, March.
    7. Herbert A. Simon, 1955. "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 69(1), pages 99-118.
    8. Gary Bornstein & Ilan Yaniv, 1998. "Individual and Group Behavior in the Ultimatum Game: Are Groups More “Rational” Players?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 1(1), pages 101-108, June.
    9. Herbert A. Simon, 1991. "Bounded Rationality and Organizational Learning," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 2(1), pages 125-134, February.
    10. repec:cup:judgdm:v:11:y:2016:i:1:p:62-74 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Stone, Dan N. & Schkade, David A., 1991. "Numeric and linguistic information representation in multiattribute choice," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 42-59, June.
    12. William J. Sutherland & Mark Burgman, 2015. "Policy advice: Use experts wisely," Nature, Nature, vol. 526(7573), pages 317-318, October.
    13. Blinder, Alan S & Morgan, John, 2005. "Are Two Heads Better than One? Monetary Policy by Committee," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(5), pages 789-811, October.
    14. Iris Vessey & Dennis Galletta, 1991. "Cognitive Fit: An Empirical Study of Information Acquisition," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 2(1), pages 63-84, March.
    15. Messick, David M. & Moore, Don A. & Bazerman, Max H., 1997. "Ultimatum Bargaining with a Group: Underestimating the Importance of the Decision Rule," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 87-101, February.
    16. Gary Charness & Matthias Sutter, 2012. "Groups Make Better Self-Interested Decisions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 26(3), pages 157-176, Summer.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kamei, Kenju & Tabero, Katy, 2021. "The Individual-Team Discontinuity Effect on Institutional Choices: Experimental Evidence in Voluntary Public Goods Provision," MPRA Paper 112106, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Fochmann, Martin & Fochmann, Nadja & Kocher, Martin G. & Müller, Nadja, 2021. "Dishonesty and risk-taking: Compliance decisions of individuals and groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 250-286.
    3. He, Haoran & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2017. "Are group members less inequality averse than individual decision makers?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 111-124.
    4. Heike Auerswald & Carsten Schmidt & Marcel Thum & Gaute Torsvik, 2013. "Teams Punish Less," CESifo Working Paper Series 4406, CESifo.
    5. Penczynski, Stefan P., 2016. "Persuasion: An experimental study of team decision making," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 244-261.
    6. Thum, Marcel & Auerswald, Heike & Schmidt, Carsten & Torsvik, Gaute, 2014. "Teams Contribute More and Punish Less," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100537, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. Tibor Besedeš & Cary Deck & Sarah Quintanar & Sudipta Sarangi & Mikhail Shor, 2014. "Effort and Performance: What Distinguishes Interacting and Noninteracting Groups from Individuals?," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 81(2), pages 294-322, October.
    8. Faralla, Valeria & Borà, Guido & Innocenti, Alessandro & Novarese, Marco, 2020. "Promises in group decision making," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 1-11.
    9. Chaudhuri, Ananish & Paichayontvijit, Tirnud & Shen, Lifeng, 2013. "Gender differences in trust and trustworthiness: Individuals, single sex and mixed sex groups," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 181-194.
    10. Maria Karmeliuk & Martin G. Kocher & Georg Schmidt, 2022. "Teams and individuals in standard auction formats: decisions and emotions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(5), pages 1327-1348, November.
    11. Balafoutas, Loukas & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Kocher, Martin & Sutter, Matthias, 2014. "Revealed distributional preferences: Individuals vs. teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 319-330.
    12. Müller, Wieland & Tan, Fangfang, 2013. "Who acts more like a game theorist? Group and individual play in a sequential market game and the effect of the time horizon," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 658-674.
    13. Anna Trunk & Hendrik Birkel & Evi Hartmann, 2020. "On the current state of combining human and artificial intelligence for strategic organizational decision making," Business Research, Springer;German Academic Association for Business Research, vol. 13(3), pages 875-919, November.
    14. Sven Christens & Astrid Dannenberg & Florian Sachs, 2017. "Identification of individuals and groups in a public goods experiment," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201755, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    15. Auerswald, Heike & Schmidt, Carsten & Thum, Marcel & Torsvik, Gaute, 2018. "Teams in a public goods experiment with punishment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 28-39.
    16. Tan, Fangfang & Xiao, Erte, 2018. "Third-party punishment: Retribution or deterrence?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 34-46.
    17. Haoran He & Marie Claire Villeval, 2014. "Are teams less inequality averse than individuals?," Post-Print halshs-01077253, HAL.
    18. Cox, Caleb A. & Stoddard, Brock, 2018. "Strategic thinking in public goods games with teams," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 31-43.
    19. Han, Johann & Kairies-Schwarz, Nadja & Vomhof, Markus, 2016. "Quality competition and hospital mergers: An experiment," Ruhr Economic Papers 609, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    20. Martin G. Kocher & Odile Poulsen & Daniel J. Zizzo, 2017. "Social preferences, accountability, and wage bargaining," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(3), pages 659-678, March.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:eurjdp:v:8:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s40070-020-00114-9. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.