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On the convergence of logit-response to (strict) Nash equilibria

Author

Listed:
  • Carlos Alós-Ferrer

    (University of Cologne)

  • Nick Netzer

    (University of Zurich)

Abstract

We show that the logit-response dynamics converges to a subset of (strict) Nash equilibria for any weakly acyclic, N-player normal form game. The result holds independently of whether revision opportunities arise as in asynchronous learning or in other ways, as long as the dynamics is regular. Our analysis generalizes and organizes recent convergence results in the literature. Further, it provides a simple selection criterion, because convergence to strict Nash equilibria obtains even in the presence of non-strict, pure-strategy Nash equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Nick Netzer, 2017. "On the convergence of logit-response to (strict) Nash equilibria," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 1-8, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:etbull:v:5:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-016-0104-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s40505-016-0104-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2015. "Learning and market clearing: theory and experiments," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(2), pages 203-241, October.
    2. Glenn Ellison, 2000. "Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(1), pages 17-45.
    3. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Nick Netzer, 2015. "Robust stochastic stability," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 31-57, January.
    4. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July.
    5. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    6. Voorneveld, Mark, 2000. "Best-response potential games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 289-295, March.
    7. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    8. Sandholm, William H., 1998. "Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 165-170, November.
    9. Marden, Jason R. & Shamma, Jeff S., 2012. "Revisiting log-linear learning: Asynchrony, completeness and payoff-based implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 788-808.
    10. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Netzer, Nick, 2010. "The logit-response dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 413-427, March.
    11. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Sanz Nogales, Jose M. & Zazo, S., 2020. "Replicator based on imitation for finite and arbitrary networked communities," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 378(C).
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    5. Satsukawa, Koki & Wada, Kentaro & Iryo, Takamasa, 2020. "Reprint of “Stochastic stability of dynamic user equilibrium in unidirectional networks: Weakly acyclic game approach”," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 117-135.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Logit-response dynamics; Weakly acyclic games; Stochastic stability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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