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Competition and environmental quality as conflicting objectives: the case of the European municipal waste industry

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  • Francesco Silvestri

    (University of Modena and Reggio Emilia)

Abstract

The article focuses on the European Union (EU) municipal waste (MW) industry, examining the conjoint functioning of EU self sufficiency principle and proximity principle (SSP/PP). Using standard IO models, we derive the quota of recycled MW under different kinds of market competition. We show that the percentage of unsorted MW, and the connected environmental problems, increases with competition, so that social welfare is lower as compared to SSP/PP implementation. Nonetheless, higher market competition in the MW industry matched with Pigouvian taxation improves social welfare upon SSP/PP.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco Silvestri, 2017. "Competition and environmental quality as conflicting objectives: the case of the European municipal waste industry," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 34(3), pages 491-513, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:epolit:v:34:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s40888-017-0067-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s40888-017-0067-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Silvestri, 2019. "Direct and indirect effects of EU Self Sufficiency Principle on Municipal Waste Management: A theoretical approach," ECONOMIA PUBBLICA, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2019(1), pages 89-98.

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