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Trade, equilibrium prices and rents in European auctions for emission allowances

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  • Bruno Bosco

    (DEMS University of Milan-Bicocca)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the price behavior of Phase III (2013–2020) EU-ETS emission allowances of CO2 by focusing on the dynamics of daily auction equilibrium prices and on the changes of the volatility of the underlying stochastic process. The paper derives the main testable statistical hypotheses (particularly that about the determinants of the conditional variance of prices) on the results derived in a model of optimal bidders’ behavior given the ETS auction rules. Tests are conducted by estimating various versions of GARCH models for both mean and variance equations of price return. Results show that the price dynamics is affected by factors including a measure of excess demand/offer and the number of winning bidders and that, contrary to expectations, reforms of the auction rules introduced at the end of Phase III explain a great part of the increased price volatility. The increased volatility is also positively associated with the bid spread and negatively associated with the number of bidders active in each auction round.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno Bosco, 2023. "Trade, equilibrium prices and rents in European auctions for emission allowances," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 25(1), pages 87-113, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:envpol:v:25:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s10018-022-00344-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10018-022-00344-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. de Perthuis, Christian & Trotignon, Raphael, 2014. "Governance of CO2 markets: Lessons from the EU ETS," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 100-106.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    EU-ETS emission auctions; Equilibrium prices volatility; GARCH models;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C32 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes; State Space Models
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • Q31 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects

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