IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/eaiere/v18y2021i2d10.1007_s40844-021-00219-z.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Economic populism and institutional changes in wage–labor relations

Author

Listed:
  • Emre Ünal

    (Firat University)

Abstract

John R. Commons emphasized the legislative role of governments in wage–labor relations, which instituted collective bargaining for labor organizations. Hence, workers largely abandoned ideas of cooperative production and socialism. This represented an institutional change in the balance power between the working class and industries. The present work discusses the case of the Turkish economy. When wage–labor relations were institutionalized in the 1960s, a strong bond between the working class and the government was established. The institutionalization of the wage–labor relationship gave considerable power to the working class, which in turn influenced government’s economic policies. This was the birth of economic populism. This institutionalization became a major obstacle to economic stability and caused a deep path dependency that resulted in chronic inflation and unstable exchange rates for decades.

Suggested Citation

  • Emre Ünal, 2021. "Economic populism and institutional changes in wage–labor relations," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 407-433, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:eaiere:v:18:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s40844-021-00219-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s40844-021-00219-z
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40844-021-00219-z
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s40844-021-00219-z?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rudiger Dornbusch & Sebastian Edwards, 1991. "The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number dorn91-1, May.
    2. Margaret Canovan, 1999. "Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 47(1), pages 2-16, March.
    3. Dani Rodrik, 2018. "Populism and the economics of globalization," Journal of International Business Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 1(1), pages 12-33, June.
    4. Rudiger Dornbusch & Sebastian Edwards, 1991. "The Macroeconomics of Populism," NBER Chapters, in: The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America, pages 7-13, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Zaslove, Andrej, 2008. "Here to Stay? Populism as a New Party Type," European Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(3), pages 319-336, July.
    6. Amable, Bruno, 2016. "Institutional complementarities in the dynamic comparative analysis of capitalism," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 79-103, March.
    7. Daniele Checchi, 1996. "Macroeconomic populism: A formal representation and a suggested interpretation of the Peruvian experience (1985-90)," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(4), pages 489-516.
    8. Wallace C. Peterson, 1982. "Worker Discontent, Wages, and Stagflation," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 977-984, December.
    9. Jeffrey D. Sachs, 1989. "Social Conflict and Populist Policies in Latin America," NBER Working Papers 2897, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Inglehart, Ronald F. & Norris, Pippa, 2016. "Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash," Working Paper Series 16-026, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    11. Luiz Bresser Pereira & Fernando Dall’Acqua, 1991. "Economic Populism Versus Keynes: Reinterpreting Budget Deficit in Latin America," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(1), pages 29-38, September.
    12. Bela Balassa, 1964. "The Purchasing-Power Parity Doctrine: A Reappraisal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 72(6), pages 584-584.
    13. J. R. Hicks, 1963. "The Theory of Wages," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-00189-7.
    14. Robert R. Kaufman & Barbara Stallings, 1991. "The Political Economy of Latin American Populism," NBER Chapters, in: The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America, pages 15-43, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Antoon Spithoven, 2018. "The Legal-Economic Nexus from the Perspective of New Institutional Economists and Original Institutional Economists," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 52(2), pages 550-558, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Christopher Ball & Andreas Freytag & Miriam Kautz, 2019. "Populism-What Next? A First Look at Populist Walking-Stick Economies," CESifo Working Paper Series 7914, CESifo.
    2. Stöckl, Sebastian & Rode, Martin, 2021. "The price of populism: Financial market outcomes of populist electoral success," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 51-83.
    3. Benczes, István & Szabó, Krisztina, 2023. "Társadalmi törésvonalak és gazdasági (ir)racionalitások. A közgazdaságtan szerepe és helye a populizmus kutatásában [Social cleavages and economic (ir)rationalities: The role of economics in populi," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 23-54.
    4. Manuel Funke & Moritz Schularick & Christoph Trebesch, 2023. "Populist Leaders and the Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(12), pages 3249-3288, December.
    5. Federico Faveretto & Donato Masciandaro, 2018. "Financial Inequality, group entitlements and populism," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1892, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    6. Donato Masciandaro, 2019. "Populism, Economic Policies, Political Pressure And Central Bank (In)Dependence," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19111, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    7. Donato Masciandaro & Francesco Passarelli, 2018. "Populism, Financial Inequality And Central Bank Independence: A Political Economics Approach," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1874, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    8. Sergei Guriev & Elias Papaioannou, 2022. "The Political Economy of Populism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 753-832, September.
    9. Pan, Wei-Fong, 2023. "Household debt in the times of populism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 205(C), pages 202-215.
    10. Scartascini, Carlos & Tommasi, Mariano & Ardanaz, Martín, 2010. "Political Institutions, Policymaking, and Economic Policy in Latin America," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1708, Inter-American Development Bank.
    11. Algan, Yann & Beasley, Elizabeth & Cohen, Daniel & Foucault, Martial, 2018. "The rise of populism and the collapse of the left-right paradigm: Lessons from the 2017 French presidential election," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) 1805, CEPREMAP.
    12. Martin Rode & Julio Revuelta, 2015. "The Wild Bunch! An empirical note on populism and economic institutions," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 73-96, February.
    13. Tito Boeri & Prachi Mishra & Chris Papageorgiou & Antonio Spilimbergo, 2021. "Populism and Civil Society," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 88(352), pages 863-895, October.
    14. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2018. "Beyond the Central Bank Independence Veil: New Evidence," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1871, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    15. Donato Masciandaro & Francesco Passarelli, 2020. "Populism, Political Pressure and Central Bank (in)Dependence," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 691-705, July.
    16. Gian Italo Bischi & Federico Favaretto & Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera, 2022. "Long-term causes of populism," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 17(1), pages 349-377, January.
    17. Campos, Luciano & Casas, Agustín, 2020. "Populism and income redistribution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    18. Gersbach, Hans & Köhler-Schindler, Laurin, 2019. "Politsplaining: Populism Breeds Populism," CEPR Discussion Papers 13919, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Seghezza, Elena & Pittaluga, Giovanni B., 2018. "Resource rents and populism in resource-dependent economies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 83-88.
    20. Mejia, Daniel & Posada, Carlos-Esteban, 2007. "Populist policies in the transition to democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 932-953, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic populism; Input–output analysis; Institutional changes; Path dependency; Turkey;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B25 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian; Stockholm School
    • D57 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Input-Output Tables and Analysis
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:eaiere:v:18:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s40844-021-00219-z. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.