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The Diffusion Approximation of Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics: Mean Effective Fixation Time and the Significance of the One-Third Law

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  • Xiudeng Zheng
  • Ross Cressman

    ()

  • Yi Tao

    ()

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    Abstract

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s13235-011-0025-4
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Dynamic Games and Applications.

    Volume (Year): 1 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 3 (September)
    Pages: 462-477

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:1:y:2011:i:3:p:462-477

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    Web page: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/13235

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    Related research

    Keywords: One-third law; Average fitness; Mean effective fixation time; Fixation probability;

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    1. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson & Petyon Young, 2003. "Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000466, UCLA Department of Economics.
    2. Nowak, Martin & Sasaki, Akira & Taylor, Christine & Fudenberg, Drew, 2004. "Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations," Scholarly Articles 3196331, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    3. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry & Young, Peyton, 2003. "Equilibrium selection in bargaining models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 296-328, November.
    4. Morris, Stephen & Rob, Rafael & Shin, Hyun Song, 1995. "Dominance and Belief Potential," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 145-57, January.
    5. Ross Cressman, 2009. "Continuously stable strategies, neighborhood superiority and two-player games with continuous strategy space," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 221-247, June.
    6. Sabin Lessard, 2011. "On the Robustness of the Extension of the One-Third Law of Evolution to the Multi-Player Game," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 408-418, September.
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